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STEPHEN F. BEFORT*
HOLLY LINDQUIST THOMAS*
The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, the Supreme Court's
Response, and the Future of
Disability Discrimination Law
T he Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)' was enacted in
1990 with considerable fanfare and support. A broad-based
coalition of supporters testified in favor of the legislation before
committee hearings2 and both houses of Congress passed the leg-
islation by wide margins.3 President George Bush, in signing the
ADA into law, described the new statute as "an historic opportu-
nity"4 representing "the full flowering of our democratic
principles.'
The ADA's joyous birth contrasts sharply with that of Title
VII,6 its older antidiscrimination law sibling. Congress, in 1964,
adopted Title VII, which bans discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex and national origin, only after a long and acri-
monious debate.7 The tenor of the debate is perhaps best illus-
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
* Associate, Ratwik, Roszak & Maloney, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota.
The authors wish to thank the students in the ADA in the Workplace class, Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School, Spring Semester 1998, for their work on class
projects which provided valuable contributions to this article.
1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 25-28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
306-10.
3 The House of Representatives passed the ADA by a vote of 403-20, while the
Senate did so by a margin of 76-8. H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 2 Cong. Index (CCH)
35,035 (1989-90); S. 933, 101st Cong., 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 21,021 (1989-90).
4 Statement by President George Bush on Signing the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, PUB. PAPERS 1070 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601,
602.
5 Id. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601.
6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
7 For a discussion of Title VII's legislative history, see W. PEPPER & F. KENNEDY,
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trated by the last minute amendment offered by an opponent of
the bill adding "sex" to the list of protected classifications in an
apparently satirical attempt to make the legislation unacceptable
to the majority of legislators.8
Why was there such a difference in the circumstances sur-
rounding the enactment of these two statutes? One explanation
is that the ADA was widely viewed at the time of its adoption as
a mere extension of existing antidiscrimination law to a group
suffering from obvious disadvantages. 9 Attorney General Thorn-
burgh testified before a House Subcommittee that passage of the
ADA was needed to fill an existing gap in federal civil rights
laws.10 This gap, he explained, could be filled by extending pro-
tection against discrimination to persons with disabilities.11
Viewed in this light, the enactment of the ADA was both an
easy and an understandable step for Congress to take. This step
was thought to be relatively easy because the ADA built upon
well-established principles of antidiscrimination law.12 Congress
had created the basic framework of American antidiscrimination
law twenty-six years earlier with the adoption of Title VII. This
framework was further refined by the enactment of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 196713 and in
thousands of court decisions interpreting these two statutes. In
addition, many of the ADA's substantive provisions were lifted
directly from the Rehabilitation Act of 197314 which prohibits
disability-based discrimination by federal employers, contractors,
and grant recipients. In his signing speech, President Bush un-
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1981); Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
BosT. C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 431 (1966).
8 See Pepper & Kennedy, supra note 7, at 17-18; Vass, supra note 7, at 441.
9 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 40, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 322, and pt. III, at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449. See also G.
PHELAN & J. ATHERTON, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE § 1.07
(1997) (stating that "[t]wenty-six years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, our nation
has conferred upon people with disabilities the same protections afforded other mi-
norities and women.").
10 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 48, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 330.
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., G. PHELAN & J. ATHERTON, supra note 9, § 1.06 (explaining that the
"basic framework of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 extends the scope
of coverage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to persons with disabilities and incorporates
the principles of nondiscrimination established in section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973").
13 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1994).
14 29 U.S.C. § 791-96 (1994).
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derscored the anticipated ease of implementing the ADA by not-
ing that the new statute incorporates the already "existing
language and standards [of] the Rehabilitation Act."' 5
The "findings and purposes" section' 6 of the ADA similarly
illustrates that the statute's adoption was an understandable step
in terms of fundamental fairness. In that section, Congress found
that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities con-
tinue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem"' 7 and that
the disabled, as a group consisting of some forty-three million
Americans,' 8 are "severely disadvantaged" in the workplace and
elsewhere.19 But, unlike individuals protected by Title VII and
the ADEA, "individuals who have experienced discrimination on
the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress
such discrimination."2 Accordingly, a central purpose of the
ADA is to provide a "national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."21
Thus, Congress' broad-based support for the ADA reflected
the anticipated ease and fairness of extending antidiscrimination
protection to the disabled. As stated in a House Committee Re-
port, "the Americans with Disabilities Act completes the circle
begun in 1973 with respect to persons with disabilities by ex-
tending to them the same civil rights protections provided to wo-
men and minorities beginning in 1964. "22
Somewhere between Capitol Hill and the federal courthouse,
however, the joyous noise of the ADA's adoption turned into a
wail of frustration. Some of the frustration results from the del-
uge of litigation that the ADA has spawned. From the ADA's
effective date in 1992 through the end of September 1998, plain-
tiffs have filed more than 108,000 charges of claimed ADA viola-
tions with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
15 Signing Statement, 1990, PUB. PAPERS 1070 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 601.
16 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
17 Id. § 12101(a)(2).
18 Id. § 12101(a)(1).
19 Id. § 12101(a)(6).
20 Id. § 12101(a)(4).
21 Id. § 12101(b)(1).
22 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 26, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449.
See also Signing Statement of President Bush, PUB. PAPERS 1070 (July 26, 1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602 (noting that the adoption of the ADA sig-
nals "the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities
from the mainstream of American life").
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(EEOC).2 3 These claims are crowding federal court dockets and
are testing the patience of the federal judiciary charged with
managing the caseload. This frustration is illustrated by the fol-
lowing comments made by a federal district court judge for the
District of Western Arkansas:
The court advised that the ADA as it was being interpreted
had the potential of being the greatest generator of litigation
ever, and that the court doubted whether Congress, in its
wildest dreams or wildest nightmares, intended to turn every
garden variety worker's compensation claim into a federal
case. [footnote omitted]
The court doubts that the ultimate result of this law will be
to provide substantial assistance to persons for whom it was
obviously intended, and that one of the primary beneficiaries
of it will be trial lawyers who will ingeniously manipulate such
ambiguities to consistently broaden its coverage so that fed-
eral courts may become mired in employment injury cases, be-
coming little more than glorified worker's compensation
referees.
24
Even more frustrating, however, is the federal judiciary's reac-
tion on a substantive level. The judicial response to a large
number of issues arising under the ADA has been startlingly di-
verse. On issue after issue, the circuit courts of appeal are split
and/or are in disagreement with the EEOC. These disagree-
ments go to some fundamental concepts under the ADA, such as
who is a protected "individual with a disability" and which party
bears the burden of establishing the availability of a reasonable
accommodation. This wide divergence of opinion illustrates some
very different viewpoints concerning the purposes and objectives
of the ADA. It also results in an unpredictable legal landscape
where employers and employees are unsure of their rights and
obligations.
The ADA in the Workplace class at the University of Minne-
sota Law School studied the judiciary's interpretation of the
ADA during Spring semester 1998. Through a series of research
papers and presentations, the class identified the most hotly de-
bated issues under the ADA during 1997 and 1998. In this Arti-
23 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA) Charges 1992-FY 1998, (last modified Feb. 12, 1997) <http://
www.eeoc.gov/status/ADAS>.
24 Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485-86 (W.D. Ark. 1994), rev'd, 60
F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 78, 19991
The ADA in Turmoil
cle, we build on that work and focus on the ten most significant
issues. Significance is based upon considerations of overall pol-
icy importance and the extent of judicial disagreement. Seven of
these issues remain in dispute as of the time of this Article's pub-
lication, with the Supreme Court having addressed the other
three issues in decisions issued during its two most recent terms.
These issues, along with the case law and agency guidance that
have addressed them, provide a valuable point of reference on at
least two levels. First, on a substantive level, this information
provides a vivid snapshot of the most dramatic legal battles being
waged under the ADA. The resolution of these issues undoubt-
edly will define the future substantive core of American disabil-
ity discrimination law. Second, these materials provide a
laboratory sample for analysis on a systemic level. By examining
this set of information, insight is gained into the reasons for the
wide divergence of judicial opinion and what this portends for
the future of the ADA.
Added to the mix are the Supreme Court's initial set of deci-
sions construing the ADA. During the October 1997 and Octo-
ber 1998 terms, the Court decided a total of six cases arising
under the ADA.25 Three of these decisions,26 each of which ad-
dress one of our set of ten disputed issues, are particularly signifi-
cant. Whether these decisions signal a path out of the current
maze of judicial disagreement, however, is far from clear.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the ADA's em-
ployment provisions and its regulatory structure. Part II dis-
cusses each of the ten disputed issues with reference to the
ADA's text, the EEOC's interpretation, and the conflicting judi-
cial decisions. Part III uses this set of issues to ascertain the rea-
sons for the existing widespread judicial dissonance in construing
the ADA. Finally, Part IV considers the importance of this phe-
nomenon for the future interpretation of the ADA, with particu-
25 Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct.
2133 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yes-
key, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
26 The Supreme Court's first decision interpreting the ADA was Pennsylvania
Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998), which ruled that the ADA is
applicable in the context of state prisons. The Bragdon decision is the Court's sec-
ond ADA case, but the first to construe the scope of a covered "disability," and also
the first to have an impact on the application of the ADA to the workplace.
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lar reference to the impact of the Supreme Court's first attempts
at interpreting the ADA.
I
ADA OVERVIEW
The ADA is codified under five separate titles. The key sub-
part generally, as well as for purposes of this article, is Title I
which prohibits disability discrimination in employment.27 Title
II bans discrimination on the basis of disability in programs and
services provided by state and local government entities,28 while
Title III does the same for public accommodations provided by
private entities.29 Title V contains various miscellaneous provi-
sions, including special rules for insurance providers.3"
In addition to the statute itself, the ADA's regulatory scheme
is bolstered by a number of interpretive provisions promulgated
by two administrative agencies. The ADA delegates regulatory 31
and enforcement 32 authority over Title I to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC has promulgated
several interpretive guides including formal regulations, 33 inter-
pretive guidance,34 and a technical assistance manual.35 The De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) has issued regulations and other
guidance with respect to Titles II and 111.36 As the ADA was
modeled on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, courts also look for
guidance to regulations and decisions interpreting that statute.37
Title I of the ADA applies to all employers with fifteen or
more employees, other than the federal government and private
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
28 Id. §§ 12131-12150.
29 Id. §§ 12181-12189.
30 Id. §§ 12201-12213. Title IV covers telecommunications relay services for the
hearing-impaired and the speech-impaired. Title IV is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 225.
31 Id. § 12116 (directing the EEOC to issue regulations under Title I).
32 Id. § 12117(a).
33 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-.16 (1998).
34 29 C.F.R. app. §§ 1630.1-.16 (1998).
35 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT (1992).
36 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104-.178 (Title II regulations) (1998); 28 C.F.R.
§§ 36.104-.505 (1998) (Title III regulations).
37 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996); Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995).
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membership clubs.3 8 The ADA went into effect for employers
with 25 or more employees on July 26, 1992.19 Employers with
fifteen or more employees became subject to the statute two
years later.4 °
A. The Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case
The heart of Title I is its prohibition against discrimination.
The statute provides that: "No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disa-
bility of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and priv-
ileges of employment."'41 This provision underscores the basic
paradox of Title I. In order to have standing to assert an employ-
ment-related ADA claim, a plaintiff must be "disabled," yet
"qualified. '4'  Thus, to make out a prima facie case under the
ADA, an applicant or employee must establish that he or she is
disabled, qualified, and has suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion because of his or her disability.43
1. Definition of "Disability"
In defining a covered "disability," the ADA borrows the Reha-
bilitation Act's three-prong definition of a "handicapped individ-
ual."4 4 An individual is disabled if he or she has "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual."45 Alternatively, a quali-
3842 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (1994). In addition to employers, Title I also applies to
employment agencies, labor organizations and joint labor-management committees.
Id. § 12111(2).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
42 Some courts have described the tension between these two requirements as cre-
ating a "catch 22" situation for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-
Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1408, n.6 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The 'Catch
22' implicit in virtually all section 504 actions is particularly evident in this case ....
Ms. Doe was required to prove her handicap for jurisdictional purposes, but simulta-
neously required to prove that she was not so handicapped as to be unqualified to
perform her job.").
43 See, e.g., Webb v. Mercy Hosp., 102 F.3d 958, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1996); Katz v.
City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996).
44 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). See also Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (explaining that "the ADA's definition of disability is
drawn almost verbatim" from the Rehabilitation Act).
45 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
fying disability exists if an individual has either a "record" of
such an impairment or is "regarded as" having such an impair-
ment.4 6 Accordingly, the ADA provides protection not only to
those individuals who are actually disabled, but also to those who
are treated as if they are disabled. As explained by the Supreme
Court in a Rehabilitation Act decision, this broader notion of
disability reflects the fact "that society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.
47
Beyond the definition of "disability," the ADA provides little
guidance as to when a condition rises to the level of a covered
disability. For example, the statute does not define key terms
used in the definition of disability, such as what constitutes an
"impairment" or a "major life activity." This task was left for the
EEOC.
EEOC regulations48 provide a definition for both of these
terms. The regulations define a "physical or mental impairment"
as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the fol-
lowing body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovas-
cular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lym-
phatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retar-
dation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.49
The regulations define "major life activities" as "functions such
as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."50
The regulations also provide guidance as to when an impair-
ment "substantially limits" a major life activity. The regulations
state that such a limitation may occur in either of two circum-
stances. First, an impairment is substantially limiting if it renders
an individual "unable to perform a major life activity that the
46 Id. § 12102(2)(B)-(C).
47 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
48 Agency regulations, of course, are not binding. Yet, as one of the agencies
charged with enforcing the ADA, its regulations are entitled to deference. See, e.g.,
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
49 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998).
50 Id. § 1630.2(i).
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average person in the general population can perform."'" Sec-
ond, an individual is substantially limited if he or she is "signifi-
cantly restricted as to the condition manner or duration" of
performing a major life activity as compared to the average per-
son in the general population.52
2. Definition of "Qualified"
The ADA provides protection only to those disabled individu-
als who are "qualified." The statute defines a "qualified individ-
ual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires."53 As this definition suggests, a determination as to
whether an individual is qualified may involve two separate, but
related, factual inquiries. The first inquiry is whether the individ-
ual can perform the "essential functions" of the job in question.
Once again, the regulations, rather than the statute, provide the
definition of this term. The regulations state that "essential func-
tions" are the "fundamental job duties" of the position, but not
those functions that are merely "marginal" in nature. 4 The reg-
ulations then suggest a number of factors that should be consid-
ered in determining whether a job function is essential or only
marginal. 55
If the answer to this first question is in the affirmative, then the
individual is "qualified" and protected by the ADA. If the an-
swer is in the negative, a second inquiry is necessary. The ADA
expressly provides that an individual's qualifications are to be as-
certained "with or without reasonable accommodation."56 An
employer has an affirmative obligation to provide a reasonable
accommodation if the accommodation will enable an applicant or
employee to be capable of performing essential job functions.
Put another way, an employer engages in discriminatory conduct
if it fails to make reasonable accommodations to the known
51 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).
52 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
5342 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
54 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1998).
55 See id. § 1630.2(n)(2) (suggesting, for example, that a function may be consid-
ered essential if it is highly specialized in nature, if only a limited number of employ-
ees are available to perform that function, or if the reason the position exists is to
perform that function).
56 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
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physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability. 57
The ADA contains an illustrative definition of the term "rea-
sonable accommodation." The statute states that a "reasonable
accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily acces-
sible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifica-
tion of examinations, training materials or policies, the provi-
sion of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.58
The regulations state that it may be necessary for an employer to
engage in an "informal interactive process" with an applicant or
employee in order to identify limitations resulting from a disabil-
ity and "potential reasonable accommodations that could over-
come those limitations."59
3. Causation
The ADA prohibits an employer from taking an adverse em-
ployment action with respect to a qualified individual with a disa-
bility only if the action was taken "because of the disability of
such individual."6 Courts interpreting the ADA frequently bor-
row Title VII's McDonnell Douglas causation standard to deter-
mine if a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of
discrimination.61 Under this approach, a plaintiff can meet his or
her initial burden of establishing a causative link between his or
her disability and an adverse employment action by means of cir-
cumstantial as well as by direct evidence.62 As one federal court
has noted, the causation step is less significant in disability cases
than in other types of discrimination cases, because employers in
the former context are more likely to admit that their decision
was disability-related, but argue, instead, that the disabling con-
57 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
58 Id. § 12111(9).
59 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
60 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
61 See, e.g., Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir.
1998); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 30 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996).
62 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
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dition rendered the plaintiff unqualified.63
B. Defenses
An employer may assert three potential defenses to an ADA
claim. First, the ADA states that an employer need not provide
an accommodation to an individual with a disability if the accom-
modation would impose an "undue hardship" on that em-
ployer.64 The undue hardship defense is available even with
respect to an accommodation that is otherwise reasonable and
which would enable a disabled individual to perform the essen-
tial functions of the job. The ADA defines an "undue hardship"
as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense."65 The
statute describes the undue hardship defense as a floating con-
cept that varies with the nature and cost of the proposed accom-
modation, the impact of the proposed accommodation upon the
operation of the facility, and the overall resources of both the
facility in question and the employer in general.66
The ADA further provides that an employer is protected in the
use of qualification standards and selection criteria, even those
that disproportionately screen out individuals with disabilities, so
long as the standard or criteria is "job-related and consistent with
business necessity. '67 The statute explicitly states that such qual-
ification standards "may include a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other indi-
viduals in the workplace. '68 The ADA defines a "direct threat"
as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by reasonable accommodation. '69  The regula-
tions extend the direct threat notion to encompass the potential
of harm to oneself as well as to others.7 °
Finally, an employer may avoid liability under the ADA by
refuting the causation element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
Under the McDonnell Douglas shifting burden of proof formula
63 Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing application of
the McDonnell Douglas test in the context of a Rehabilitation Act case).
64 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
65 Id. § 12111(10)(A) (1994).
6 6 Id. § 12111(10)(B).
67 Id. § 12113(a). This provision appears to codify the "business necessity" de-
fense to a claim of disparate impact discrimination as recognized under Title VII by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
68 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
69 Id. § 12111(3).
70 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1998).
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borrowed from Title VII,7 1 once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden of producing evidence
shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for its actions.72 If successful, the employer will
prevail unless the plaintiff can show that the employer's stated
reason is pretextual and that discrimination was the true motivat-
ing factor.73
C. Enforcement and Remedies
The ADA expressly incorporates Title VII's enforcement pro-
cedures and remedies as its own.74 Under that scheme, a plaintiff
must file a charge with the EEOC before proceeding to litiga-
tion.75 An ADA claimant has the right to a jury trial on claims of
intentional discrimination.76 A court may award a successful
claimant a broad array of relief including injunctive relief, back
pay, reinstatment, attorneys' fees, compensatory damages, and
punitive damages. 77 Title VII caps the latter two items of dam-
ages on a sliding scale based on the size of the particular
employer.78
II
TEN DISPUTED ISSUES
This section examines the ten most hotly disputed issues under
the ADA during the 1997 to 1998 period on a substantive level.
We first lay out the relevant statutory text and EEOC interpreta-
tion for each issue. The conflicting judicial decisions are then dis-
cussed and analyzed.
71 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). The Supreme
Court further refined the McDonnell Douglas formula in Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
72 See, e.g., Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir.
1998) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test in an ADA case).
73 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
74 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
75 Id. § 2000e-5 (1994).
7 6 Id. § 1981a(c) (1994).
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (authorizing injunctive relief, back pay and rein-
statment); id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (authorizing attorneys' fees); id. § 1981a(b) (au-
thorizing compensatory and punitive damages).
78 Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D). An employer will not be liable for compensatory or
punitive damages if it demonstrates that it made good faith efforts to provide the
plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation. Id. § 1981a(a)(3).
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Issue 1: Should a court consider mitigating measures in determin-
ing whether an ADA plaintiff is substantially limited?
Text: The ADA defines a covered "disability" as a mental or
physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activ-
ity.79 An individual also is considered to be disabled if he or she
has a record of having such an impairment or is regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment.8 0 The text of the ADA is silent about
whether mitigating measures should be considered when deter-
mining whether an individual is substantially limited.
EEOC Position: The EEOC interpretive guidance suggests
that mitigating measures should not be considered as lessening
any substantial limitation originally arising out of a disability.8 '
Instead, a case-by-case evaluation is recommended, without re-
gard to the ameliorating effect of medicines, or prosthetic and
assistive devices.82
Case Law: Many courts have ignored the guidance of the
EEOC, instead choosing to evaluate the limitations that a plain-
tiff confronts only after considering the impact of mitigating
measures. In Gilday v. Mecosta County,83 for example, plaintiff
was a non-insulin dependent diabetic who had difficulties in the
workplace, such as getting along with people, when he departed
from his medical regimen of medication, exercise, and proper
diet. A majority of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel ana-
lyzed plaintiff's limitations in light of his medical regimen,
thereby disregarding the EEOC guidance." Nevertheless, the
court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for
the employer, finding a question of fact as to whether the plain-
tiff may be substantially limited even with the mitigating
measures.
85
The First Circuit took the opposite approach in ruling that a
diabetic applicant's status under the ADA should be based on his
underlying medical condition without regard to the ameliorative
79 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
80 Id.
81 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1998).
82 Id.
83 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
84 The panel in Gilday issued three separate opinions. Two of those opinions de-
clined to defer to the EEOC guidance. See id. 124 F.3d at 766 (Kennedy, J. opin-
ion); 124 F.3d at 768 (Guy, J. opinion).
85 All three members of the Gilday panel agreed with this conclusion. 124 F.3d
761, 765 (Moore, J. opinion); id. at 766, 768 (Kennedy, J. opinion); id. at 768 (Guy,
J. opinion).
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effects of insulin treatment.86 The court found that the EEOC
guidance is consistent with the legislative history of the ADA in
which House and Senate Committee reports explicitly state that
impairments should be assessed without considering the impact
of mitigating measures.87 The First Circuit also found the guide-
lines consistent with the broad remedial purpose of the statute to
protect all disabled individuals and to eradicate discrimination
based on stereotypical assumptions.88 A number of other courts
agree with this interpretation.89
The resolution of this issue hinges, in large part, on the amount
of deference that should be given to the EEOC guidance. Many
of the decisions adopting the EEOC's suggested approach stress
that the EEOC's guidelines should be followed so long as they
represent a permissible construction of the statute.90 The two-
judge panel majority in Gilday disagreed with this approach but
for different reasons. One judge disregarded the guidance be-
cause he thought that the interpretation was inconsistent with the
statute and impermissibly lowered the standard of protection for
individuals who use mitigating measures.9 The other judge be-
lieved that the guidance established a blanket rule that violated
the case-by-case approach advocated in the statute.92 The most
commonly voiced arguments against adopting the EEOC ap-
proach are that the guidance conflicts with the ADA by reading
the "substantially limiting" requirement out of the statute,93 and
86 Arnold v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998).
87 Id. at 859-60 (citing to H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 28 (1989) and S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
88 136 F.3d at 861-62.
89 See, e.g., Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir.
1997) (epilepsy controlled by medication); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624
(8th Cir. 1997) (vision impairment mitigated by glasses); Harris v. H & W Con-
tracting Co., 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996) (Graves disease controlled by medica-
tion); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dep't., 964 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Penn. 1997)
(vision impairment mitigated by glasses); Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp.,
960 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Va. 1997) (hearing impairment mitigated by hearing aid).
90 Arnold, 136 F.3d at 864 (giving the guidance "some deference," as long as it is a
permissible construction of the statute); Harris, 102 F.3d at 521 (stating that an
agency interpretation should be followed if it is a permissible construction of a silent
or ambiguous statute); Wilson, 964 F. Supp. at 904 (giving the same credence to the
interpretive guidance as to other guidelines because they were subject to the same
notice and comment procedures).
91 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767 (Kennedy, J. opinion).
92 Id. at 768 (Guy, J. opinion).
93 See, e.g., Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that the
guidance approach would compel disability per se status); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz,
Co., 851 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (stating that the guidance approach would
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that the guidance approach creates a "slippery slope" that will
make the ADA's coverage far broader than ever intended.94
In a September 1998 decision, the Fifth Circuit staked out a
middle position on this issue. The Fifth Circuit, in Washington v.
HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., ruled that "only serious im-
pairments and ailments that are analogous to those mentioned in
the EEOC Guidelines and the legislative history-diabetes, epi-
lepsy, and hearing impairments-will be considered in their un-
mitigated state." 95 The court initially opined that the most
reasonable reading of the ADA would be to take mitigating
measures into account. However, the court deferred to the op-
posite reading of the statute contained in the EEOC's guidelines
and the legislative history and adopted a standard which blends
the two positions together. The court held that in order for im-
pairments to be considered in an unmitigated state, "[t]he im-
pairments must be serious in common parlance, and they must
require that the individual use mitigating measures on a frequent
basis, that is, he must put on his prosthesis every morning or take
his medication with some continuing regularity." 96 Adopting a
case-by-case mode of analysis, the Washington court concluded
that "[s]ome conditions, such as diabetes, will clearly have to be
considered without regard to mitigating measures; [while] others,
such as hip replacements, will have to be evaluated with regard
to mitigating measures. '97
Supreme Court Resolution: The Supreme Court resolved this
circuit split in June 1999 by affirming the Tenth Circuit in Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc. 98 In a 7-2 decision, the Sutton majority
held that the determination of whether an individual is "substan-
tially limited" in a major life activity and thereby "disabled" for
purposes of the ADA should be made with reference to both the
compel disability per se status and render meaningless the ADA's requirement of a
"substantial limitation").
94 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) (explic-
itly rejecting the guidance and voicing a concern about the slippery slope that would
be created if people who could see without impairment while wearing glasses were
protected under the ADA); Testerman v. Chrysler Corp., 1997 WL 820934 (D. Del.
1997) (rejecting the guidance and noting that the ADA was intended only to protect
individuals with severe disabilities).
95 152 F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1998).
96 Id. at 470.
97 Id. at 471 (emphasis in original).
98 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). The Sutton decision is discussed in more detail infra at
notes 405-438 and accompanying text.
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positive and negative effects of mitigating measures.99 The Court
rejected the contrary recommendations of the agency guidelines
as "an impermissible interpretation of the ADA."'"
Issue 2: Is asymptomatic HIV a disability under the ADA?
Text: An individual is disabled for purposes of the ADA only if
he or she is "substantially limited" in a major life activity.1"' The
ADA does not define or describe what is meant by the phrase
"major life activity."
Agency Position and Legislative History: Both the EEOC and
the DOJ consider HIV-positive status a per se disability.10 2 The
legislative history of the ADA also indicates that Congress in-
tended the ADA to protect persons with asymptomatic HIV.' °3
The EEOC's interpretive guidance on Title I describes "major
life activities" as "those basic activities that the average person in
the general population can perform with little or no difficulty."''
Case Law: Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts uniformly
ruled that asymptomatic HIV was a disability.1"5 Since new med-
ical treatments have slowed the advance of HIV to full-blown
AIDS, this assumption has been more frequently challenged. 10 6
Most courts still find that HIV constitutes an impairment, 07
although at least one has found that asymptomatic HIV, by defi-
nition, is not an impairment because of the absence of any cur-
rently impairing attributes. 10 8 Most courts disagree with the
agency interpretations and find that HIV is not a disability per
se. 109 Some, however, find that HIV-positive status is a disability
per se, thus avoiding the difficult individual fact
99 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
100 Id.
101 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
102 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1998) (EEOC); 29 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) (DOJ).
103 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 51 (1989); S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 22
(1989).
104 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i).
105 See, e.g., Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1990); Ray v. School Dist. of
DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified
Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
106 See generally Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The
Legal Impact of the New Social Construction of HJV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1997).
107 See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir.), cert. granted in part,
118 S. Ct. 554 (1997); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).
108 See Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
109 See, e.g., Id; Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. and Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55 (4th
Cir. 1995); Cortes v. McDonald's Corp., 955 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. N.C. 1996).
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determinations."10
The real battleground in this debate lies in whether HIV sub-
stantially limits a major life activity. In Runnebaum v. Nation-
sBank of Maryland,"' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, found that procreation and intimate sexual rela-
tions are not major life activities. The court further held that the
plaintiff was not substantially limited in those activities because
HIV infection does not physically prevent an individual from en-
gaging in sex or from having biological children. The Run-
nebaum court found that the effects of the disease simply may
persuade a person to choose not to have sex or procreate." 2
Many courts agree that reproduction is not a major life
activity. 1
13
Other courts have found differently. In Abbott v. Bragdon,"'
for example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that repro-
duction constitutes a major life activity because of its "singular
importance to those who engage in it, both in terms of its signifi-
cance in their lives and in terms of its relation to their day-to-day
existence.""' 5 The court in Abbott also found that the risk of
transmitting the HIV virus to one's child results in a substantial
limitation on the exercise of reproductive activities." 6
Supreme Court Resolution: The Supreme Court, in Bragdon v.
Abbott," 7 resolved this dispute by affirming the First Circuit's
disability finding in a 5-4 decision issued in June 1998. In a ma-
jority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court ruled that
an individual with asymptomatic HIV infection satisfied all three
elements of the ADA's disability definition. The Bragdon Court
first found that HIV qualified as a physiological impairment from
110 See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d
1455 (11th Cir. 1990); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166 (D. N.J. 1995); United States
v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092 (E.D. La. 1994).
111 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997).
112 Id. at 171-72.
113 See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996);
Cortes, 955 F. Supp. 541; Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.
La. 1995), affd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996).
114 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.), cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
115 Id. at 941; accord Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. I11.
1996); Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges, 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill.
1995); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
116 Abbott, 107 F.3d at 942 (finding that an HIV-positive pregnant woman faces a
25% risk of transmitting the virus to her child without AZT therapy, and an 8% risk
with such therapy).
117 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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the moment of infection because of its "constant and detrimental
effect on the infected person's hemic and lymphatic systems.
118
The majority then agreed with the First Circuit that reproduction
should be considered a major life activity because of its compara-
tive importance to the human life process.119 Finally, the Court
found that the plaintiff's ability to reproduce was substantially
limited because of a significant risk of transmitting the HIV virus
to both her sexual partner and child.12 °
Issue 3: When is someone substantially limited due to a restriction
on lifting and/or working?
Text: The ADA states that a person is disabled if he or she is
"substantially limited" in one of the "major life activities" of
such individual. 121 The statute does not define or describe either
of these terms.
EEOC Position: EEOC regulations contain a nonexhaustive
list of major life activities that includes "working," but not "lift-
ing." 122 The EEOC interpretive guidance includes both "lifting"
and "working" on its list of illustrative major life activities. 123
The guidance further states that a court should only consider lim-
itations on the major life activity of working if an individual is
not substantially limited in any other major life activity. 124
The regulations provide that an individual is "substantially lim-
ited" if he or she either is unable to perform a major life activity
or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or dura-
tion of performing such an activity when compared to the aver-
age person in the general population.1 25 Also, an individual is
"substantially limited" in terms of working only when restricted
from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 126
Case Law: The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Mc-
Kay v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing27 is illustrative of how some
courts are treating this issue. In McKay, the plaintiff was re-
stricted from lifting more than twenty pounds due to her carpal
tunnel syndrome. She was also restricted in terms of making re-
118 Id. at 636.
119 Id. at 637-38.
120 Id. at 639-40.
121 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
122 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
123 Id. app. § 1630.2(i).
124 Id. § 1631.2(j).
125 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) and (ii).
126 Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
127 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997).
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petitive motions and in using vibrating tools. 128 The majority
opinion did not analyze whether the plaintiff was substantially
limited in the major life activity of lifting, as the regulations sug-
gest, but instead focused solely on whether she was substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. From the facts on
the record, the duration, manner, and condition of McKay's inju-
ries seem to have met the regulation's standards for a substan-
tially limiting restriction on both lifting and working. 129 Expert
witnesses also testified that McKay was restricted in her ability to
perform two full classes of jobs. 3' Nonetheless, the court found
that the plaintiff was disqualified from only a narrow range of
jobs, those involving repetitive motion or lifting more than ten
pounds, and was therefore not protected under the ADA."'
Courts increasingly are recognizing "lifting" as a major life ac-
tivity for purposes of the ADA. 132 Most courts, however, do not
treat lifting restrictions as a per se disability, but instead imple-
ment a case-by-case approach of individualized assessment.'33
These courts generally agree that lifting restrictions similar to
McKay's are not substantially limiting."3 The Tenth Circuit,
however, disagreed and held that a lifting restriction of fifteen
pounds raised a question of fact precluding a grant of summary
judgment for the employer. 135 Some trends are discernable when
viewing these cases as a whole. First, courts generally will find an
employee to be disabled if he or she cannot lift objects weighing
as little as ten pounds. In contrast, courts generally will find that
an employee is not substantially limited if he or she is subject to a
128 Id. at 371.
129 See id. at 376-79 (Hillman, J., dissenting).
130 See id. at 375 (Hillman, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 373.
132 See, e.g., Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1996);
Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1996).
133 See, e.g., Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir.
1996); Panzullo v. Modell's P.A. Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
134 See, e.g., Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that a 25 pound restriction did not substantially limit the plaintiff's ability to lift);
Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., 115 F.3d 613 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the inability
of plaintiff to lift greater than ten pounds frequently did not substantially limit her
ability to perform any major life activity); Williams, 101 F.3d 346 (finding that a 25
pound restriction is not disabling); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, 85 F.3d
1311 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 25 pound lifting limitation did not constitute a
significant restriction on the plaintiff's major life activities); see also Ray v. Glidden
Co., 85 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that plaintiff who was restricted from
"heavy lifting" was not substantially limited).
135 Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1996).
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lifting restriction of twenty-five or more pounds. While the sta-
tus of lifting restrictions in between these two figures is subject to
debate, courts increasingly appear reluctant to treat such individ-
uals as disabled.
Whether a court will find that a lifting restriction substantially
limits the major life activity of working depends on how the court
defines the class of jobs from which the plaintiff is precluded. In
McKay, the court easily could have found that the plaintiff was
precluded from a class of jobs rather than a few positions. 36 By
narrowly describing the type of jobs at issue, the McKay court
reached the opposite conclusion. Uncertainty over the weight of
the EEOC regulations and a lack of clear guidance from the
courts has led to considerable unpredictability in terms of deter-
mining when an employee is substantially limited in the major
life activity of working.
Issue 4: How recent must "current drug use" be in order for an
addict to be unprotected under the ADA?
Text: While drug addiction is a disabling condition, 37 the
ADA provides that an individual is not "qualified" if he or she is
"currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs." '138 The ADA
provides a "safe harbor" for recovering addicts that protects indi-
viduals who have successfully completed or are participating in a
supervised drug rehabilitation program and are no longer engag-
ing in the illegal use of drugs. 139 These provisions are not clear
about when drug use is to be considered "current" or what effect
the safe harbor provision has when a current or recent drug user
enters a rehabilitation program.
EEOC Position: The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance states
that an employee illegally using drugs during the weeks or
months prior to discharge is a "current" illegal drug user ex-
cluded from statutory protection.14 The EEOC's guidance does
136 110 F.3d 369, 374-82 (Hillman, J., dissenting); cf. Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal
Co., 102 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 1996) (lifting, pulling and pushing restrictions disquali-
fied plaintiff from broad range of jobs); Webb v. Garelick Mfg., 94 F.3d 484 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that heavy duty jobs constitute a class of jobs); Lowry v. Cabletron
Sys., Inc., 973 F. Supp. 77 (D.N.H. 1997) (holding that plaintiff with carpal tunnel
syndrome and other joint problems was substantially limited from a class of jobs).
137 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.3 (1998). See
also Shafer v. Preston Meml. Hosp., 107 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 1997).
138 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a).
1 39 Id. § 12114(b).
140 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.3.
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not suggest a specific time frame for determining when past use
of illegal drugs is to be considered "current."
Case Law: A number of courts have held that illegal drug use
in the recent past is "current" and disqualifies that individual
from ADA protection. In Shafer v. Preston Memorial Hospi-
tal,'14 1 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee
who illegally used drugs in a periodic fashion during the weeks
and months prior to discharge was a "current" user for purposes
of the ADA. The court considered the ADA's legislative history,
citing a Conference Committee Report stating that the term
"currently engaging" is "intended to apply to a person whose ille-
gal use of drugs occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable
belief that a person's drug use is current.' 1 42 The court held that
"current" means a "periodic or ongoing activity.., that has not
yet permanently ended."' 43
The Shafer court also concluded that an employee cannot es-
cape discharge simply by entering a rehabilitation program prior
to being fired. The employer in Shafer had placed the plaintiff
on administrative leave while investigating allegations that she
had been using drugs while on duty. The plaintiff then entered a
rehabilitation program shortly before the employer terminated
her employment. The Shafer court held that the safe harbor pro-
vision does not permit an employee to escape the consequences
of her current drug use simply by entering a treatment pro-
gram. 44 While most courts that have considered this issue agree
with this conclusion, 45 an open question remains as to whether
the safe harbor provision protects an employee who, without en-
gaging in misconduct, voluntarily identifies his or her addiction
and enters treatment. 46
Courts have been reluctant to establish a bright line standard
for determining when recent drug use is considered "current"
141 107 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1997).
142 Id. at 279 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-596, at 64).
143 Id. at 278.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Wormley v. Arkla, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
146 Compare Grimes v. United States Postal Serv., 872 F. Supp. 668, 675 (W.D.
Mo. 1994), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1243 (8th Cir. 1996) (suggesting a distinction in the situa-
tion where an individual voluntarily identifies her addiction and enters treatment
from the situation where an individual enters treatment only after her employer
discovers the employee's illegal drug use) with Zenor v. El Paso Health Care Sys.,
176 F.3d 847, 858 (1999) (ruling that a voluntary entry into treatment does not auto-
matically "propel" an employer into the protection of the safe harbor provision).
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and disqualifying. A number of courts have ruled that drug use
three to seven weeks in the past constitutes "current" use.147 On
the other hand, two courts in non-ADA contexts have ruled that
individuals who have been free of drug use for periods of nine
months 141 or one year 149 are not disqualified because of current
use.
Issue 5: Is a person who claims to be "totally disabled" for pur-
poses of receiving disability benefits estopped from bringing an
ADA claim?
Text(s): The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating
"against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability."' 5 ° A person is a "qualified individual with a disability"
if he or she can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position in question with or without reasonable accommo-
dation. 5 ' In order for a claimant to be eligible to receive social
security disability benefits, he or she must be unable "to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically de-
terminable physical or mental impairment.' ' 52
EEOC Position: The EEOC recommends that estoppel apply
only when a claimant's representations in applying for disability
benefits are explicitly contradictory to his or her status as a
"qualified" individual under the ADA.'5 3 The EEOC empha-
sizes that a claimant may be eligible for disability benefits and
still be a qualified individual for purposes of the ADA, noting the
different standards used by the Social Security Act (SSA) and
the ADA. 5 4 The EEOC Notice provides a list of factors used to
determine whether estoppel is appropriate in a particular case,
147 See Salley v. Circuit City Stores, No. CIV 96-6368, 1997 WL 701302 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 29, 1997) (holding that drug use three weeks prior to discharge was "current");
Baustian v. Louisiana, 910 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. La. 1996) (seven weeks); McDaniel v.
Mississippi Baptist Med. Ctr., 877 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (six weeks); Worm-
ley v. Arkla, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (one month): see also Collings
v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995) (drug use during the weeks and
months prior to discharge found to be "current").
148 Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988) (deciding issue of
qualifications under Rehabilitation Act).
149 United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992)
(deciding issue of current use under similar provision in the Fair Housing Act).
15042 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
151 Id. § 12111(8).
152 id. § 423(d)(1)(A).
153 EEOC Notice #915.002 (last modified Feb. 12, 1997) <http://www.eeoc.gov/
docs/qidreps.txt>.
154 Id.
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including the relevant definitions under the two statutes, the spe-
cific content of the representations made, when the representa-
tions were made, and whether the claimant asked the employer
for a reasonable accommodation. 155
Case Law: Some courts have held that an individual who
claims to be totally disabled when applying for social security dis-
ability benefits, or some other disability benefit program, is judi-
cially estopped per se from bringing an ADA claim.156 These
courts conclude that an individual who makes such a claim can-
not possibly be a "qualified" individual for purposes of the
ADA.157 The application of judicial estoppel in this context
serves the goal of judicial integrity by barring ADA claims from
employees who have formally admitted their inability to engage
in substantial gainful employment.158
Most recent decisions have disagreed with this per se ap-
proach. The D.C. Circuit held in Swanks v. Washington Metro-
politan Area Transit Authority,'59 that the receipt of SSA benefits
does not automatically preclude a claim under the ADA. The
court emphasized that the five-step inquiry that the SSA uses in
determining whether an individual is disabled for purposes of re-
ceiving benefits does not consider whether the claimant can per-
form work if afforded a reasonable accommodation.1 60 Because
the ADA considers the possibility of reasonable accommodation
in determining whether a person is a "qualified individual," a
plaintiff claiming disability for SSA purposes may still be a quali-
fied individual for ADA purposes. Most courts now follow the
reasoning of Swanks and decline to apply a per se ban on plain-
tiffs who have received or applied for disability benefits.' 6 '
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996); Rissetto v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 1996); DeGuiseppe v. Vil-
lage of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have
since abandoned the per se approach to the estoppel issue in subsequent decisions.
See infra note 161. While the McNemar decision remains good law in the Third
Circuit, a more recent decision has questioned the wisdom of the per se approach
and raises the possibility that the Third Circuit will revisit this issue in the future.
See Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1997).
157 See McNemar, 91 F.3d at 617-18.
158 Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1997).
159 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
160 Id. at 585.
161 See, e.g., Johnson v. Oregon, 141 F.3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998); Griffith v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998); McCreary v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,
132 F.3d 1159 (7th Cir. 1997); Talvera v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d
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Under the Swanks approach, the impact of prior representa-
tions made by individuals applying for disability benefits will be
scrutinized on a case-by-case basis for inconsistency. While an
individual's representation that he or she is "totally disabled" on
a benefit application form does not automatically preclude a sub-
sequent ADA claim, statements asserting that a claimant is un-
able to perform the essential functions of the job, even with a
reasonable accommodation, will support an employer's motion
for summary judgment in a subsequent ADA case.16 2
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits staked out a middle position on
this issue. In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp. ,163
for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff who represents
on a disability benefits application that she is "totally disabled,"
creates a rebuttable presumption that judicial estoppel will apply.
The Eighth Circuit similarly has ruled that such prior representa-
tions will bar an ADA claim unless the plaintiff can produce
"strong countervailing evidence" to overcome those earlier
statements. 164
Supreme Court Resolution: On May 24, 1999, the Supreme
Court issued a unanimous decision reversing the Fifth Circuit's
determination in the Cleveland case.165 The Court held that a
claim of disability discrimination under the ADA and a claim for
disability benefits under the SSA are not inherently incompati-
ble. 16 6 As such, the Court stated that it was inappropriate for
courts to use a "special negative presumption" in assessing the
ADA claim of an individual who had applied for or received dis-
ability benefits.167 Instead, the Court explained, an ADA plain-
tiff can survive a motion for summary judgment based on prior
statements made when applying for disability benefits if he or she
offers a sufficient explanation of why, despite the prior state-
ments, he or she is nonetheless able to perform the essential
1214 (11th Cir. 1997); D'Aprile v. Fleet Services Corp., 92 F.3d 1 (lst Cir. 1996);
Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
162 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1479-81 (9th Cir. 1996).
163 120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997); see also McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up
Corp., 131 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. 1998).
164 Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1998); Dush
v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997).
165 Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999). The Cleve-
land decision is discussed in more detail infra at notes 392-404 and accompanying
text.
166 Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
167 Id. at 1602.
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functions of the job, with or without reasonable accom-
modation.168
Issue 6: Who has the burden of proving the existence or nonexis-
tence of a direct threat in a situation where the absence of causing
harm also is a qualification standard?
Text: The ADA defines a "direct threat" as "a significant risk
to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation." '169 The ADA states that, in order
to meet qualification standards, an individual may be required
not to pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individ-
uals in the workplace. 7 ° The statute goes on to say that the em-
ployer may use this standard as a defense to a charge of
discrimination. 7 ' This section of the statute appears under a
heading entitled "Defenses.' 72 The ADA does not state which
party bears the burden of proof on the direct threat issue.
EEOC Position: The EEOC interpretative guidance appears
to place the burden of establishing the existence of a direct threat
upon the employer.'73 The EEOC also takes the position that a
direct threat may include a significant risk of substantial harm to
oneself, as well as to others. 17
4
Case Law: In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,17 the
Supreme Court concluded that it is the plaintiff who must show
that his or her condition does not pose a direct threat to others.
The Arline case arose under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, which, in its implementing regulations, defines a "qualified
individual" as expressly including a person who does not endan-
ger the health and safety of that individual or others.' 76
It is not clear whether the ADA follows the Rehabilitation Act
approach or charts a different course. The ADA's listing of the
direct threat concept in the section entitled "Defenses" arguably
implies that the employer bears the burden of demonstrating that
the plaintiff poses a direct threat of harm. The legislative history
of the statute, however, supports a reading that it is the plaintiff's
168 Id. at 1604.
169 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994).
170 Id. § 12113(b).
171 Id. § 12113(a).
172 See id. § 12113.
173 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1998).
17 4 Id.
175 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
176 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(6) (1998).
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burden, as part of the prima facie case, to show that his or her
condition would not pose a direct threat of significant harm.177
In a recent decision under the ADA, EEOC v. Amego, Inc. ,178
the First Circuit followed the Rehabilitation Act approach in
spite of the different statutory formulation. The plaintiff in
Amego was a health care worker whose essential job functions
included overseeing and administering the dispensation of medi-
cations to patients. The plaintiff twice attempted suicide by
overdosing on medications, and her supervisors became con-
cerned about her ability to dispense medications in a safe man-
ner.179  The court held that when "essential job functions
necessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demon-
strate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not
endanger others."18  Other courts have agreed with this
interpretation. 181
Some courts have chosen to follow the EEOC interpretation
and treat the direct threat issue as an affirmative defense that
must be proven by the employer.18 2 One court explained that
"Congress imposed this burden on employers because of a con-
cern that safety standards are often based on stereotypes and
used by employers to rationalize discrimination."'8 3
A 1999 decision by the Fifth Circuit, Rizzo v. Children's World
Learning Centers (Rizzo II),'"' appears to blend these two posi-
tions. In that case, the panel majority held that while an em-
ployee generally bears the burden to show that he or she is not a
direct threat as part of the prima facie case, the burden of persua-
sion shifts to the employer in cases where the employer has im-
posed safety requirements that tend to screen out individuals
with disabilities.18" The dissent in that case argues, however, that
"the exception swallows the rule" under such a test since safety
177 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 337.
178 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997).
179 Id. at 138-41.
18 0 Id. at 144.
181 See Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995);
Altman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
182 See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs. Inc., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. Exxon, 967 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Tex. 1997); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624 (1998) (placing burden of persuasion on defendant in a non-employment
case arising under Title III of the ADA).
183 Exxon, 967 F. Supp. at 210.
184 173 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 1999).
185 Id. at 259.
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standards are necessarily implicated whenever the direct threat
issue is raised. 186
Issue 7: Who has the burden of establishing the availability of a
reasonable accommodation?
Text: The ADA does not expressly address which party bears
the burden of establishing the existence and feasibility of a rea-
sonable accommodation. The statute, however, does state that
an employer acts with discrimination if it fails to make reason-
able accommodations to the known limitations of a disabled indi-
vidual unless the employer can show that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship.'87 This language arguably sug-
gests that employers bear the burden of proving inability to ac-
commodate as part of the undue hardship affirmative defense.
On the other hand, in order to be "qualified" to bring a claim
under the ADA, an employee must show that he or she can per-
form the essential job functions with or without reasonable ac-
commodation. 188  This language arguably suggests that
employees have the burden to show the availability of a reason-
able accommodation that will enable them to perform essential
job functions.
EEOC Position: The EEOC interpretive guidance states that
the appropriate reasonable accommodation is best determined
through a "flexible, interactive process" involving both the em-
ployer and the employee.189 The guidance recommends that em-
ployers (1) analyze the particular job at issue; (2) consult with the
disabled individual to ascertain how job-related limitations could
be overcome; (3) determine, in consultation with the disabled in-
dividual, potential accommodations and the effectiveness of
each; and (4) consider the preference of the individual in select-
ing and implementing the accommodation most appropriate for
both the employee and the employer.19
Case Law: Courts have been all over the map in allocating the
burden of proof with respect to reasonable accommodation.
Many early Rehabilitation Act cases placed the burden entirely
on the employer to demonstrate that a reasonable accommoda-
tion is not possible.19' Under the ADA, at least two circuits have
186 Id. at 272 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
187 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
188 Id. § 12111(8).
189 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1998).
190 Id.
191 See, e.g., Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985);
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adopted the opposite approach and placed the burden of proof
entirely on the employee.' 92 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in a 1997 decision, held that an employer is not liable for
failing to make an accommodation unless the employee identifies
the accommodation, establishes that it will enable the employee
to perform the essential functions of the job, and proves that the
accommodation is reasonable in nature.
19 3
A growing number of circuits are now charting a middle course
by adopting burden of proof formulations that are either split,
shared, or both. The Second Circuit, for example, splits the bur-
den of proof between employees and employers. 194 The em-
ployee bears the burden of both production and persuasion to
show that he or she is qualified for the position in question. To
meet this burden, the employee must identify a possible accom-
modation and show that it will enable him or her to perform the
essential functions of the position. 195 The employee bears only a
burden of production, however, on the question of whether such
accommodation is reasonable. Under the Second Circuit's ap-
proach, the employer has the ultimate burden of persuasion to
establish that the proposed accommodation is unreasonable. 96
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a shared burden approach
that endorses the interactive process envisioned by the EEOC.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the responsibility for failing to
identify a reasonable accommodation should be assigned to the
party responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process, a
decision that must be made on a case-by-case basis.' 97 There-
fore, the disabled individual must provide information about the
disability and the limitations it imposes, while the employer must
provide the work-related information necessary to determine the
feasibility of an appropriate reasonable accommodation.
198
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); Prewitt v. United States Postal
Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
192 Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282 (11th Cir. 1997); Monette v. Electronic
Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (adopting a similar approach under the Rehabilitation Act).
193 Willis, 108 F.3d at 284-85.
194 Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995). Although this
case arose under the Rehabilitation Act, the court expressly noted that the result
would be the same under the ADA. Id. at 138.
195 Id. at 137-38.
196 Id. at 138.
197 Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996).
198 Id. at 1136.
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Finally, the Third Circuit, through its disposition of two
cases, 1 99 appears to have adopted an approach where the parties
both share and split the burden of proof. Under this approach,
both the employee and the employer must make reasonable ef-
forts to identify a possible reasonable accommodation. After this
stage, the burden shifts twice, with the employee first having the
burden to show that the accommodation will enable him or her
to perform the essential job functions, and the employer then
having the burden to show that the accommodation is
unreasonable.2 °°
Issue 8: Must an employer reassign a disabled employee to a va-
cant position for which the employee is qualified if the employee
cannot perform the essential functions of his or her current posi-
tion even with a reasonable accommodation?
Text: An employee is a "qualified individual with a disability"
for purposes of the ADA if he or she is able to perform the es-
sential functions of a position with or without reasonable accom-
modation. 21  The ADA specifically lists "reassignment to a
vacant position" as an example of a reasonable accommodation
that an employer may be required to provide.20 2 The statute,
however, does not expressly state whether a person who seeks
reassignment must be able to perform the essential functions of
his or her former job or whether it is enough that he or she will
be able to perform the essential functions of the desired position.
The ultimate question involves whether an employee's status of
being "qualified" is measured before or after the reassignment.
EEOC Position: The EEOC interpretive guidance suggests
that an employer has a duty to reassign an employee to a vacant
position for which he or she is qualified "if there are no accom-
modations that would enable the employee to remain in the[ir]
current position. '2 3 The guidelines state that "[i]n general, reas-
signment should [only occur] when accommodation within the in-
dividual's current position would pose an undue hardship. ' 2°
Case Law: Prior to its 1992 amendments,20 5 the Rehabilitation
199 Gaul v. Lucent Techs., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 1998); Mengine v. Runyon, 114
F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 1997).
200 Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420.
201 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
202 Id. § 12111(9)(B).
203 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1998).
2
o
4 Id.
205 Rehabilitation Act Pub. L. No. 102-569, Title I, § 102 (p) 3 2 , 106 Stat. 4360,
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Act did not list reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable
accommodation. 2°6  Accordingly, cases interpreting the pre-
amendment Rehabilitation Act concluded that employers were
not required to reassign a disabled employee, who could not per-
form the essential functions of his or her current position, to an-
other vacant position unless such a transfer was consistent with
the employer's existing personnel policies.2 °7
Some courts have continued to apply the Rehabilitation Act
rule under the ADA. In Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. ,208 the
Tenth Circuit held that the ADA does not obligate an employer
to reassign an employee who cannot perform the essential func-
tions of his or her current job.20 9 In Smith, the plaintiff suffered
from chronic dermatitis. After a ten-month leave of absence, the
employer discharged the employee because it could not accom-
modate his skin sensitivity in the employee's current light assem-
bler position. The employee sued, claiming that the employer
should have reassigned him to a different position that would not
aggravate his skin condition. The court ruled for the employer,
interpreting the EEOC guidelines as adopting reassignment as an
accommodation only "when accommodating him in his current
position is possible, but difficult for his employer. ' 210 The court
noted that the ADA is not designed to require employers to ac-
commodate every disabled employee, only those who are "quali-
fied individuals" capable of performing their current jobs in spite
of their disabilities.211 While Smith has been overturned by a
June 1999 en banc ruling,212 other courts continue to adhere to
this position.213
4428. The 1992 amendments attempted to harmonize interpretation of the non-af-
firmative action provisions of the Rehabilitation Act with the new ADA. The Reha-
bilitation Act now states that "[t]he standards used to determine when this section
has been violated in a complaint alleging non-affirmative action employment dis-
crimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990." Id. § 791(g).
206 See 29 U.S.C. § 791-794e (1994).
207 See, e.g., Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922
(5th Cir. 1993); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987); Jasany v. United States
Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); see also School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19 (1987).
208 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1998).
209 See Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995); Lang v. City of Maplewood,
574 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. App. 1998).
210 Smith, 138 F.3d at 1308.
211 Id. at 1309.
212 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
213 See Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995); Martin v. Lockheed Martin
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Other decisions have reached the opposite conclusion and
found that the ADA compels a different result with respect to
reassignment than did the pre-1992 Rehabilitation Act. The
First, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal have
ruled that reassignment to a vacant position is a reasonable ac-
commodation required under the ADA so long as the employee
is qualified to perform the essential job functions of the position
to which he or she is reassigned.214 These decisions interpret the
phrase "qualified individual with a disability" as referring to a
person who can perform the essential functions of the position
that he or she either currently holds or desires by means of a
reassignment. 215 The Seventh Circuit, in Gile v. United Airlines,
Inc., surveyed the case law on this issue and dismissed those
agreeing with the earlier Smith decision as "mistakenly rely[ing]
upon preamendment Rehabilitation Act cases.
216
A more recent Seventh Circuit decision, while agreeing with
the holding of Gile, has cautioned that an employer's reassign-
ment duty is not unlimited. In Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automo-
tive, Inc. ,217 the court opined that an employer would not be
required to reassign an employee to a vacant position when such
a transfer would violate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy of
that employer. The Dalton court cited to a number of examples
of such policies, including those denying transfers to employees
who are under- or over-qualified or where an employer has
adopted a policy of not retaining employees who warrant a
demotion.218
The District of Columbia Circuit, in October 1998, narrowly
adopted the majority position in a 7-4 en banc decision. The ma-
Missiles & Space, No. C96-4620 FMS 1998 WL 303089 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Cheatwood
v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Ala. 1995); Lang v. City of Maplewood,
574 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. App. 1998).
214 Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780 (1st Cir. 1998); Gile v. United Airlines,
Inc., 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1996); Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d. Cir. 1996)
(deciding issue under amended Rehabilitation Act language); Benson v. Northwest
Airlines Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit arguably has adopted
this approach as well. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995)
(describing reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, but
rejecting it under the circumstances of the case because it would give a part-time
employee priority over a full-time employee in violation of the city charter).
215 Gile, 95 F.3d at 497-98.
216 Id. at 498.
217 141 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 1998).
218 See id. at 678.
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jority opinion in Aka v. Washington Hospital Center21 9 expressly
disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Smith and held
that reassignment to a vacant position is a reasonable accommo-
dation so long as the disabled employee "can perform the essen-
tial functions of the employment position to which she seeks
reassignment. '220  The majority also rejected the contention
voiced in two dissenting opinions221 that an employer satisfies its
accommodation duty simply by allowing a disabled employee to
compete on equal terms with nondisabled employees for a vacant
position.222 According to one of the dissenting opinions, the ma-
jority's reading of the ADA inappropriately provides disabled
employees a "hiring preference" over more qualified, non-dis-
abled applicants.2 23
A related issue that is emerging concerns whether an employer
must prefer a qualified disabled employee in filling a vacancy
over a better qualified, nondisabled, employee or applicant.
Although numerous courts have stated that the ADA does not
impose an affirmative action requirement,224 it is not clear what
this means in practice. Some decisions suggest that an employer
satisfies its accommodation duty simply by allowing a disabled
employee to compete on equal terms with nondisabled employ-
ees for a vacant position.225  At the opposite extreme, some
courts suggest that a disabled employee is entitled to a desired
reassignment so long as the employee is minimally qualified for
the position and the reassignment does not otherwise impose an
undue hardship.226 Still other courts, in between, suggest that an
219 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
220 Id. at 1301.
221 Id. at 1311 (Henderson, J. dissenting); Id. at 1315 (Silberman, J. dissenting).
222 Id. at 1304-05.
223 Id. at 1311 (Henderson, J. dissenting).
224 See, e.g., Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379, 384-85
(2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the employer "did not have an affirmative duty to pro-
vide Wernick with a job for which she was qualified; the [employer] only had an
obligation to treat her in the same manner that it treated other similarly qualified
candidates."); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995) ("we do
not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabil-
ities, in the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given a priority in hiring or
reassignment over those who are not disabled").
225 See, e.g., Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1995);
Thompson v. Dot Foods, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 622 (C.D. 11. 1998). See also Aka v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Henderson, J., dissent-
ing), 156 F.3d at 1315 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
226 See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). See
also Wood v. County of Alameda, No. C941557 TEH 1995 WL 705139 (N.D. Cal.
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employer must do "something more" than just permitting a dis-
abled employee to post for openings, without specifying exactly
what is required.227
Issue 9: Does the ADA require an employer to reassign a disabled
employee to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation
when such a transfer would violate the seniority provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement?
Text: Employers have a duty under the ADA to make reason-
able accommodations to the known limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability unless such accommodation
would impose an undue hardship.228 The ADA lists reassign-
ment to a vacant position as an example of a possible reasonable
accommodation.22 9 The ADA also prohibits contractual arrange-
ments which have the effect of discriminating against a qualified
disabled individual.23 ° Neither the ADA nor the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)2 31 expressly address how a conflict be-
tween a reassignment accommodation under the ADA and a sen-
iority provision of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated
under the NLRA should be resolved.
EEOC Position: The EEOC, in both its interpretive gui-
dance232 and the Technical Assistance Manual,233 suggests that
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant in
determining whether an accommodation would impose an "un-
due hardship." In an amicus brief filed in Eckles v. Consolidated
Rail Corp. ,234 the EEOC proposed a balancing approach in
which the terms of a collective bargaining agreement would serve
as one relevant factor. This position finds support in the legisla-
tive history which indicates that collective bargaining agreement
provisions are relevant but not determinative on the reassign-
1995) ("[alllowing the plaintiff to compete for jobs open to the public is no accom-
modation at all").
227 See, e.g., Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("the word 'reassign' must mean more than allowing an employee to apply for a job
on the same basis as anyone else .... the core word 'assign' implies some active
effort on the part of the employer").
228 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
229 Id. § 12111(9)(B).
230 Id. § 12112(b)(2).
231 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.
232 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1998).
233 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, A Technical Assistance Manual
on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act
§§ 3.9 and 7.11 (1992).
234 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1318 (1997).
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ment issue.235
Case Law: As with the preceding issue, the courts are strug-
gling to determine whether the ADA retains or alters the ap-
proach taken under the pre-1992 Rehabilitation Act. Cases
interpreting that statute uniformly held that an employer did
need not to reassign a disabled employee when such action
would violate the seniority provisions of a labor contract.236 That
conclusion, however, was based, in part, on the fact that the older
Rehabilitation Act did not list reassignment to a vacant position
as a reasonable accommodation.
The majority of courts that have considered this issue under
the ADA adhere to the former Rehabilitation Act interpreta-
tion.237 The leading case, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Eck-
les,238 adopted a per se rule that an employer is not required to
violate a seniority system agreed upon in a collective bargaining
agreement in order to reassign a disabled employee as a reason-
able accommodation. In reaching this conclusion, the court
stressed the relative advantage of a predictable, bright-line "no
bumping required" rule.239 The court also emphasized that its
conclusion was limited to collectively bargained seniority rights
as they had a "pre-existing special status in the law" that Con-
gress had shown no intent to alter in enacting the ADA.24 °
At least two court decisions have rejected the per se approach
in favor of a balancing one.2 41 In Aka v. Washington Hospital
242 ,1otiCenter, a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed
the statutory language, legislative history, and EEOC interpreta-
tions and concluded that all three are inconsistent with the per se
235 H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
236 See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1989); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d
465 (4th Cir. 1987); Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir.
1984).
237 See, e.g., Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3d. Cir. 1997); Foreman v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d
1041 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1318 (1997); Benson v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118 (10th
Cir. 1995).
238 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1146 (1997).
2 39 Id. at 1051.
240 Id. at 1051-52.
241 Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc
granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Emrick v. Libbey-
Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
242 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124
F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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approach of Eckles.243 The court instead adopted a balancing
standard that weighs the need for an accommodation with the
degree of hardship imposed by the infringement on seniority
rights.244 This balance, the court noted, should be based on the
particular circumstances of each case with a potential "contin-
uum" of results.2 45 The Aka decision subsequently was va-
cated 246 and then reversed on other grounds in an en banc
decision.247
This conflict in statutory rights also arises in the context of la-
bor arbitration. Not surprisingly, most,248 but not all,249 labor ar-
bitrators have chosen to give preference to the seniority
provisions in a labor agreement over the accommodation re-
quirement of the ADA.
Issue 10: Does an employer and/or an insurance provider violate
the ADA in providing disability insurance that distinguishes be-
tween mentally and physically disabled individuals in terms of
their eligibility for disability benefits?
Saving the best for last, this topic really consists of three unset-
tled sub-issues. Each is discussed below.
A. Does a fully disabled former employee have standing to sue
his or her ex-employer under Title I of the ADA?
Text: In order to have standing to challenge an employer-pro-
vided disability insurance policy as discriminatory under the
ADA, a plaintiff must be a "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity."'25 The ADA, in Title I, defines a "qualified individual with
a disability" as a person who can perform the essential functions
of his or her position with or without reasonable
accommodation. 25
EEOC Position: Neither the EEOC regulations nor the inter-
243 Id. at 895-96.
244 Id. at 896.
245 Id.
246 Reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
247 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
248 See, e.g., Alcoa Building Products, 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 364 (1995)
(Cerone, Arb); Olin Corp., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 481 (1994) (Helburn, Arb).
249 See City of Dearborn Heights, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 809 (1993) (Kanner,
Arb.) (using balancing approach to uphold reassignment of disabled employee
rather than senior employee preferred by labor agreement).
250 See Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997).
251 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
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pretive guidance address this issue. In litigation, the EEOC has
taken the following position:
[T]he relevant "employment position" in any case involving
post-employment fringe benefits, is the position actually occu-
pied by plaintiff, that of benefit recipient, and that as long as
the plaintiff satisfies any non-discriminatory eligibility criteria
for receipt of benefits, he is a "qualified individual" within the
meaning of the ADA.252
According to the EEOC, a former employee has standing to sue
under the ADA so long as he or she is qualified to receive
benefits.
Case Law: A number of courts have held that a former em-
ployee who is fully disabled and receiving disability benefits lacks
standing to bring suit under Title I of the ADA.25 3 According to
these courts, the former employee is not a "qualified individual
with a disability" because he or she no longer can perform the
essential functions of the former job.254 Since only fully disabled
individuals qualify for disability benefits in the first place, this
interpretation has been criticized as effectively preventing any
benefits recipient from ever challenging an employer's provision
of disability benefits on grounds of discrimination. 55
As noted above, the EEOC attempts to avoid this result by
asserting that the relevant "employment position" for which a
plaintiff may be a "qualified individual" is that of a benefits re-
cipient.256 This approach goes to the opposite extreme and auto-
matically confers standing on a former employee who is a
beneficiary under a disability benefit policy. The Seventh Circuit
has criticized the EEOC interpretation on the grounds that an
"employment position" necessarily refers to a job, not simply the
task of collecting benefit checks.257 Thus far, no court has
adopted the EEOC position.
252 Leonard v. Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., No. 95 Civ. 6964 (CLB) 1996 WL
634860, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1996).
253 Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Tenn. 1995),
affid in part and rev'd in part, 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc granted,
judgment vacated, 107 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1997), reh'g en banc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir.
1997); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996); Gonzales v. Garner
Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (llih Cir. 1996).
254 Parker, 875 F.Supp. at 1325-26, and 99 F.3d at 186; EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96
F.3d at 1043-45.
255 See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1162-63 (E.D. Va. 1997).
256 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
257 EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d at 1043-44.
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A recent decision of the Third Circuit, Ford v. Schering-Plough
Corp. ,258 sanctioned the result sought by the EEOC, but on dif-
ferent grounds. The Ford court borrowed from a 1997 Supreme
Court decision that authorized former employees to bring suit
under Title VII for post-employment retaliation. 259 The Third
Circuit extended this principle to the ADA and held that former
employees may sue their former employer with respect to disabil-
ity-based discrimination in the provision of post-employment
benefits.2 °
Some courts have opted for an interpretation in between the
extremes of the above approaches. In Lewis v. Aetna Life Insur-
ance Co. ,261 the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia
held that the standing issue should be determined with reference
to the plaintiff's status at the time that he or she was offered the
allegedly discriminatory disability insurance plan. In that case,
the court ruled that an employee who was partially disabled yet
qualified to perform the duties of the job, at the time that he was
offered the disability plan, had a vested right to challenge the
plan even though fully disabled at the time of bringing suit.2 6 2
The Lewis court left open the question of whether a nondisabled
person would have the same vested right. Another district court
decision refused to dismiss a former employee's challenge to a
disability plan, but held that the claim was only viable for the
period before the plaintiff became fully disabled.263
B. May the former employee bring suit against the insurance
provider under Title III as a public accommodation?
Text: The ADA, in Title III states that "[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, ad-
vantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommoda-
tion by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation. 2 64 Among those entities listed
as a public accommodation for purposes of Title III is an "insur-
258 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
259 See Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
260 Ford, 145 F.3d at 607-08.
261 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997).
262 Id. at 1162-63.
263 Esfahani v. Medical College of Pa., 919 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
264 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
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ance office." '2 6 5 In addition, Title IV of the ADA contains a safe
harbor provision that insulates insurance providers from liability
when "[u]nderwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering
such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law."
266
DOJ Regulations: The Department of Justice has adopted reg-
ulations interpreting Title III of the ADA. These regulations de-
fine a "place of public accommodation" as a "facility operated by
a private entity. '267 The regulations then go on to define a "facil-
ity" as "all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites. '268 The
DOJ Technical Assistance manual states that "[i]nsurance offices
are places of public accommodation and, as such, may not dis-
criminate on the basis of disability in the sale of insurance con-
tracts or in the terms or conditions of the insurance contracts
they offer. 269
Case Law: An individual may bring an action against an insur-
ance provider under Title III only if the disability insurance pol-
icy is a good or service provided by a place of public
accommodation.27 ° Some courts have held that the term "public
accommodation" encompasses only physical places and struc-
tures.271 They base this conclusion on the fact that the entities
listed as "public accommodations" in the statute are primarily
physical places open to public access.2 7 2 The Sixth Circuit, in
Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,273 while admitting
that an "insurance office" is a place of public accommodation,
ruled that an employee who obtained a disability plan through
her employer did not have a necessary physical nexus with an
insurance office.274 That court further held that Title III only
regulates the accessibility to a place of public accommodation
and not the contents of those goods and services offered by the
265 Id. § 12181(7)(F).
266 Id. § 12201(c).
267 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998).
268 Id.
269 Department of Justice, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE III TECHNI-
CAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, § 111-3.11000.
270 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
271 Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997); Pappas v. Bethesda
Hosp. Ass'n., 861 F. Supp. 616, 619-20 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
272 See, e.g., Ford, 145 F.3d at 612; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014.
273 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
274 Id. at 1010-11, 1014.
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public accommodation.275
Several other courts have concluded that Title III does reach
the sale or provision of insurance policies and have allowed ac-
tions against insurers to go forward on that basis.2 76 These courts
do not require a physical nexus between a plaintiff and an insur-
ance office, arguing that such a holding would lead to the absurd
result that those people entering an office would be protected
while those people who merely transact business over the phone
would not.2 77 Some of these courts rely, in part, on the fact that
neither the statute nor the regulations expressly limit covered
public accommodations to physical places. 27' Finally, some of
these courts also find that the inclusion of the safe harbor provi-
sion regarding insurance providers illustrates that the ADA was
intended to cover the contents of insurance plans and not just
access to insurance offices.2 79
C. Do Distinctions Between Mental and Physical Disabilities
Constitute Discrimination Within the Meaning of
the ADA?
Text: The ADA states that no covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability with respect to "job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 280 The ADA's
discrimination ban extends to contractual arrangements which
have the effect of subjecting an employer's disabled employees to
discrimination.281 Finally, while the ADA expressly preserves
the right of insurance providers to underwrite, classify or admin-
ister risks, they may not do so as a "subterfuge" to evade the
anti-discrimination purposes of the statute.282
275 Id. at 1012.
276 See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of
New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994); Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F.
Supp. 557 (D. Minn. 1998); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va.
1997); World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Kotev v. First
Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
277 See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19; Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at
1164-65.
278 See, e.g., Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1164.
279 See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 20.
280 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
281 Id. § 12112(b)(2).
2 82 Id. § 12201(c).
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EEOC/DOJ Position: The EEOC regulations state that the
ADA bars discrimination on the basis of disability with regard to
fringe benefits whether or not administered by the employer.283
The DOJ's Technical Assistance Manual suggests that the under-
writing and classification of risks in insurance policies must be
supported by sound actuarial principles.284
Case Law: In Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. ,285 the district
court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the ADA pro-
hibits disability insurance policies from providing different bene-
fit levels for mental as opposed to physical disabilities unless the
distinction in treatment is grounded in sound actuarial data. In
reaching this conclusion, the Lewis court relied, in part, on other
decisions finding insurance plan distinctions unlawful that have
the effect of either denying coverage 286 or providing inferior cov-
erage287 on the basis of a particular disability in the absence of
actuarial justification. The court stressed the fact that the dis-
crimination is between individuals with different disabilities, as
opposed to discrimination between disabled and nondisabled
persons, is of no importance so long as the discrimination occurs
because of an individual's particular disability status288 In a sub-
sequent opinion following a bench trial, the Lewis court con-
cluded that the disability plan in question was invalid because the
distinction in benefit coverage was not justified by actuarial
data.289 In a June 1999 decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that "the ADA does not require a long-
term disability plan.., to provide the same level of benefits for
mental and physical disabilities. '29 °
The majority of the courts that have addressed this issue agree
with the Fourth Circuit.291 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Parker
283 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(f) (1998).
284 Department of Justice, AMERICANS WiTH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE III TECHNI-
CAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, § 111-3.11000.
285 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997).
286 See, e.g., Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Cal. 1997);
Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422 (D. N.H. 1996).
287 World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
288 Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1168-69.
289 Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 7 F. Supp.2d 743 (E.D. Va. 1998).
290 Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir. 1999).
291 See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. CNA Ins Co., 96
F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir.
1996); Moddemo v. King, 82 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (interpreting the Rehabilita-
tion Act).
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v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 292 is the leading case of those
denying liability. In Parker, the court stated that "the ADA does
not mandate equality between individuals with different disabili-
ties. Rather, the ADA [only] prohibits discrimination between
the disabled and the non-disabled." '293 The Parker court ex-
plained that disability plans with benefit levels that differentiate
between those with mental and physical disabilities do not offend
the ADA because all employees subject to such a policy, whether
disabled or non-disabled, receive the same access to the plan.294
The Third Circuit, in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp. ,295 agreed
with Parker and pointed to two pieces of legislative history in
support of that conclusion. First, the Ford court cited to a pre-
enactment Senate report 296 taking the position that the proposed
legislation, while requiring that individuals with disabilities must
have equal access to health insurance coverage, would not re-
quire identical benefit levels for all disabling conditions.297 The
Ford decision also looked to Congress' defeat of an amendment
to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996298 which would have mandated parity in insurance coverage
for mental and physical illnesses.299 As the Ford court noted,
"[s]uch an amendment would have been unnecessary altogether
if the ADA already required such parity."3"
III
SOURCES OF JUDICIAL DISSONANCE
The preceding section illustrates a profound degree of judicial
disagreement in interpreting the ADA. At first blush, this phe-
nomenon may be seen as surprising given the ease of implemen-
tation predicted by President Bush in his signing statement.3 °1
This section attempts to ascertain the causes of this divergent ju-
dicial construction. In undertaking this task, the discordant set of
cases reviewed above offer a valuable frame of reference and
292 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
2 93 Id. at 1015.
294 Id. at 1015-16.
295 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
296 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 29 (1989).
297 Ford, 145 F.3d at 610.
298 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
299 Ford, 145 F.3d at 610.
300 Id.
301 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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provide evidence as to a number of forces at work. A review of
these factors reveals that the current state of judicial dissonance
should be anything but surprising.
A. The ADA is More Complicated than Title VII and
the ADEA
The conventional wisdom at the time of the ADA's adoption
was that the statute merely served to extend existing antidis-
crimination principles to individuals with disabilities. 30 2 As a
House Committee Report summarized, the ADA "completes the
circle ... with respect to persons with disabilities by extending to
them the same civil rights protections provided to women and
minorities beginning in 1964.3o3
In hindsight, however, it is obvious that this assumption was a
significant oversimplification. The ADA and Title VII are not
identical. The ADA incorporates a more complicated antidis-
crimination formula than does Title VII or the ADEA, a differ-
ence which necessarily compels greater judicial oversight.
Title VII and the ADEA both use a relatively simple formula
in banning discrimination. Using the language of Title VII to il-
lustrate, the formula goes as follows: "It shall be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to... discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin[.] '3 4 Although matters of proof may be
complicated under these two statutes, the legal principle is clear
and straightforward. Discrimination "because of" a listed trait is
unlawful.
The ADA's ban on disability-based discrimination is consider-
ably more complicated. Paraphrasing four different portions of
the statue,30 5 the ADA's antidiscrimination formula can be stated
as follows:
No employer shall discriminate against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability because of the disability of such individual
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position, unless the
302 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
303 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 26, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449
(1990).
304 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The ADEA uses similar language in banning discrimi-
nation because of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) ("It shall be unlawful for an employer
to . . . discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's age").
305 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A), 12113(b) (1994).
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accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the oper-
ation of the business of that employer, or unless such individ-
ual would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others.
The ADA's formula is clearly longer and contains more twists
and turns. More importantly, in addition to the core "because
of" prohibition, the ADA uses five terms, highlighted above, that
are not found in either Title VII or the ADEA.
The more complicated ADA formula necessarily requires a
greater degree of judicial interpretation. Our set of disputed is-
sues bears out this relationship. All ten of the issues discussed in
the preceding section turn on a construction of one or more of
the five extra components of the ADA's formula.
The "disability" issue has proven to be particularly trouble-
some. Fully one-half of our disputed issues involve this subject.
Under the ADA, an employee is protected only if he or she
meets the statute's definition of disability.3"6 A plaintiff has
standing under the ADA only if he or she is a member of the
class of individuals who have an impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity.
This standing requirement is a substantial departure from Title
VII's framework. Title VII does not impose any class member-
ship standing requirement. That statute protects members of all
races, as well as both women and men.307 Title VII bans discrim-
ination "because of" an individual's race or gender, but does not
require that a person be of any particular race or gender in order
to be protected. The fact that Title VII claims are asserted more
frequently by women and minorities is a function of society's so-
cial and economic forces, rather than the dictates of Title VII
itself.
The ADA is very different. Only individuals who meet the
statute's definition of "disability" are protected. This inevitably
means that the courts will be called upon to determine who
meets this initial standing requirement.
In this regard, the ADA is more closely related to the ADEA.
The ADEA also protects only a specific class of employees,
namely those who are 40 years of age or older.30 8 The standing
306 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The term "disability" is defined in
§ 12102(2).
307 See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition
of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 423-24 (1997).
308 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994).
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issue under the ADEA, however, does not pose a difficult fact
question. The ADEA adopts a bright-line age standard which is
easy to ascertain. In contrast, the ADA's class standing require-
ment necessitates a difficult, case-by-case factual inquiry.
The reasonable accommodation/undue hardship portions of
the formula also necessitate extensive judicial construction. This
is a two-step process in which the reasonableness of an accom-
modation must be weighed against its burdensomeness.3 °9 This
inquiry is fact specific with respect to each employer, taking into
account individual resources and type of operation. 310 Thus, an
accommodation that may be reasonable for a large employer
may pose an undue burden for a smaller employer.31'
While the ADA's formula is more complicated than that of
either Title VII or the ADEA, it is substantially similar to that of
the Rehabilitation Act. Given this similarity, one may ask why
almost two decades of experience under the Rehabilitation Act
did not remove much of the uncertainty that currently surrounds
the ADA.
Our sample provides some clues. One answer is that the ADA
is not a carbon copy of the Rehabilitation Act. While using the
Rehabilitation Act as a model, Congress deviated from the
model in a number of respects, such as listing reassignment to a
vacant position as a reasonable accommodation,312 including the
direct threat notion in the section entitled "defenses, '313 and ex-
plicitly disqualifying current users of illegal drugs.31 4 Accord-
ingly, at least four of our disputed issues turn, in part, on
statutory language that differs from that in the Rehabilitation
Act. Of the remaining six issues, all but one, the disability status
of an individual with asymptomatic HIV, concern a question that
was not authoritatively resolved under the Rehabilitation Act.
The narrower reach of the Rehabilitation Act, apparently, did
not generate the body of case law necessary to determine many
of the issues now plaguing the courts of appeal under the ADA.
309 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
310 See § 12111(10).
311 Compare Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir.
1995) (undue hardship defense not available to state employer with large resources)
with Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (overseas assignment preference for
diabetic employee would impose an undue hardship on employer given the small
size of its workforce).
312 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
313 Id. § 12113(b).
314 Id. § 12114(a).
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In sum, courts are now facing a litigation explosion under the
ADA because that statute uses an antidiscrimination formula
that is complicated and still in an early stage of development.
While this may explain the sheer volume of litigation, it is just the
first step in understanding the extent of judicial dissonance.
B. Lack of Statutory Detail
In spite of the complicated formula, the ADA provides only
minimal guidance as to how that formula should be imple-
mented. The statute bans disability discrimination in a broad,
sweeping outline, but leaves the details to the EEOC and the
courts.
This lack of statutory detail contributes to judicial dissonance
in two readily apparent ways. First, it creates uncertainty and
invites litigation. Second, the ADA's broad outline provides the
courts with a large zone of discretion to interpret the statutory
language as they see fit.
The definition of "disability" again provides a good illustra-
tion. The ADA defines a covered "disability" as including "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities... "315 The scope of this defini-
tion necessarily depends on the meaning attributed to each of its
three subparts. That is, in order to determine whether a particu-
lar condition is a covered disability, the terms "impairment,"
"major life activity," and "substantially limits" must be defined.
The ADA, however, neither defines nor describes any of these
three terms. Not surprisingly, much of the battle in terms of the
first three issues discussed in the preceding section involves a de-
bate as to how these three terms should be construed.
The ADA fails to elaborate on many other key concepts as
well. The following list of undefined or undescribed terms was
compiled just from our set of disputed issues:
-how recent is "current" drug use;
-what are "essential job functions;"
-which party bears the burden of proving the existence of a
"direct threat" or a "reasonable accommodation;"
-how should "qualified" be defined for purposes of reassign-
ment and the post-employment receipt of benefits;
-what are "public accommodations;" and
-when is an insurance plan a "subterfuge" to evade the pur-
pose of the ADA?
315 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
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In essence, Congress, in enacting the ADA, announced its op-
position to disability discrimination, but provided only minimal
guidance in describing the type of conduct to which it was op-
posed. The end result is a large delegation of authority to the
EEOC and the courts, and a significant contributing factor to the
current divergence of judicial opinion.
C. Lack of Agency Deference
A potentially limiting factor with respect to the scope of judi-
cial discretion under the ADA is the interpretive pronounce-
ments of the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the
statute. The EEOC and the DOJ have attempted to fill some of
the gaps left by Congress through issuing formal regulations and
a variety of other interpretive publications.316 Taken together,
these interpretive guides are quite detailed and state positions
with respect to virtually all of the ten issues discussed above.
One might expect that these guides would help to reduce the
impact of Congress' lack of clarity and detail. As the agencies
charged with enforcing the ADA, their interpretation of the stat-
ute generally is entitled to great deference.317 The Supreme
Court has held that where a statute is silent or ambiguous, a re-
viewing court should adhere to an agency's regulatory interpreta-
tion if based on a permissible construction of the statute.318
Nonetheless, the courts are all over the board in terms of the
amount of deference given to agency guidance. Some courts give
the regulatory interpretations great weight and adopt agency rec-
ommendations.319 Other courts reject or minimize the impact of
EEOC and DOJ interpretations. 320 The most frequently invoked
method used by such courts is to find that consideration of
agency interpretations is unnecessary because of the unambigu-
316 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
317 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
318 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
319 See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 761, 763-64 (6th Cir. 1997)
(Moore, J., opinion); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir.
1996).
320 See, e.g., Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 841 F. Supp. 808, 812 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
(noting that the EEOC interpretive guidance is not legislative in nature and that
they "simply state what the administrative agency thinks the statute means, and only
remind affected parties of existing duties").
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ous text of the statute.321 Relying on this textual approach, ap-
pellate courts have rejected EEOC advice on such issues as the
impact of mitigating measures,322 the burden of proving a direct
threat of harm,323 and the qualification standard for post-employ-
ment benefit recipients.
324
It is not clear why so many courts refuse to give deference to
agency opinions. Some courts, focusing on the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidance, note that they are entitled to less deference than
formal regulations because they are not promulgated pursuant to
delegated legislative authority or following notice and comment
procedures. 325 Even here it is well-settled that such interpreta-
tions are entitled to at least some degree of deference.326
Other, less technical factors may be at work. The lack of def-
erence simply may be a convenient way for a court to implement
its own views as to the proper construction of an unclear, yet
overarching, statute. Another possible explanation is that some
courts may view the agency guidance as slanted. In this regard, it
is interesting to note that in every instance in which the EEOC
has taken a position on one of our set of ten issues, it has done so
in a manner favorable to a plaintiff's perspective. This suggests
that some courts discount the EEOC's positions as those of a
pro-employee advocate instead of a neutral agency authority.
In any event, courts that decline to give deference to agency
guidance remove yet another potential obstacle to an unfettered
construction of the ADA. Without statutory or agency directives
to limit judicial discretion, almost any reading of the ADA be-
comes defensible.
D. Significant Policy Choices
The wide divergence in the judicial interpretation of the ADA
reflects more than a mere opportunity to exercise judicial discre-
tion. It also reflects a wide range of opinions about the goals and
321 See, e.g., Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Coghlan, 841 F. Supp. at 812.
322 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
323 EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997).
324 EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
325 See, e.g., Washington v. HCA Health Services, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 469-70 (5th
Cir. 1998).
326 See generally Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977); Washington, 152 F.3d
at 470.
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purposes of the ADA. Faced with the significant social and eco-
nomic issues implicated by the ADA, judges have a powerful in-
centive to exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with
their own set of beliefs.
The definition of "disability" once again provides a good point
of reference. The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment
with respect to individuals who fit within the "disability" defini-
tion.327 For those individuals who meet this definition, the ADA
represents a giant leap forward in the extension of basic civil
rights protection. On the other hand, the ADA and its compli-
cated antidiscrimination formula imposes considerable con-
straints on the resources and flexibility of American employers.
The overall impact of the ADA depends, in large part, on how
many individuals are considered disabled for purposes of ADA
coverage. In the findings and purposes section of the ADA, Con-
gress estimated that the law would apply to 43,000,000 Ameri-
cans.328 In reality, the reach of the ADA depends upon how
broadly the "disability" definition is construed. Our set of dis-
puted issues illustrate that the potential exists for either a drastic
expansion or a drastic contraction in the number of individuals
meeting that definition. If the definition of disability extends to
individuals with vision problems controlled by eyeglasses, 15
pound lifting restrictions, a genetic predisposition to cancer, and
depression lessened by Prozac, the ADA will protect far more
than forty-three million Americans. If, however, individuals with
diabetes, carpal tunnel syndrome, and cancer in remission are
not deemed disabled, the numbers protected by the ADA will be
far less than estimated.
Judges faced with these choices in summary judgment motions
must decide between two powerful policy arguments. Employers
persuasively argue that a finding of disability status will extend
ADA protection to individuals who really do not currently suffer
from substantial limitations on their daily activities. Representa-
tives of the disabled correctly argue that omitting such individu-
als from the ADA's protection will permit employers to act on
stereotypes and preconceptions. If these judges have few re-
straints on their discretion, they will likely decide the issue based
upon which of these two arguments best resonates with their own
personal beliefs.
327 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
328 Id. § 12101(a)(1).
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The reasonable accommodation requirement provides another
example of a significant policy choice. Under the ADA, an em-
ployee's qualifications for the job are to be ascertained "with or
without reasonable accommodation." '329 An employer acts with
discrimination if it fails to make reasonable accommodations for
an otherwise qualified applicant or employee.33 ° This reasonable
accommodation duty is a concept alien to most antidiscrimina-
tion claims brought under Title VII or the ADA. 33 1 An em-
ployer has no duty under Title VII to provide any form of
remedial assistance to a female or minority employee who cannot
perform essential job duties.332 Viewed in this light, the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement is, in essence, a form of
affirmative action for disabled individuals. It requires employers
to take certain steps, short of an undue hardship, to assist dis-
abled applicants and employees who otherwise fall short of re-
quired job performance capabilities. Under Title VII, even
voluntary affirmative action steps have been criticized,333 hotly
debated,334 and, under some circumstances, found to be unlaw-
ful.335 The ADA, in contrast, makes at least some such steps
mandatory.
Given the controversial nature of affirmative action, it is not
surprising that courts have adopted vastly different notions of
what the reasonable accommodation duty entails. At least three
329 Id. § 12111(8).
330 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
331 A limited duty of reasonable accommodation arises under these two statutes
only with respect to religion, which is a protected trait under Title VII. That statute,
similar to the ADA, provides that an employer must reasonably accommodate the
religious observances and practices of its employees up to the point of undue hard-
ship. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994). The reasonable accommodation duty for reli-
gious observances, however, is much more limited than that mandated by the ADA.
The Supreme Court has ruled that an employer need not incur more than a de
minimus hardship in providing an accommodation for religious purposes. See TWA,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
332 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) ("Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted
to require any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individ-
ual or group.").
333 See, e.g., Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839 (1996);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring: The
Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1993).
334 See Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative Action, 82
CAL. L. REV. 893 (1994) (summarizing and critiquing the ongoing affirmative action
debate).
335 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
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circuit courts have ruled that an employer must accommodate an
employee who can no longer perform his or her current job by
means of a preferential reassignment to a vacant position that the
employee can perform.336 Other circuits have taken the contrary
view that an employer need not reassign an employee who is no
longer capable of performing his or her current position.337 As
one of these latter courts explained, to impose such a duty would
go beyond the ADA's antidiscrimination purpose to impermissi-
bly require preferential treatment.338
A third example concerns the status of mental or psychiatric
disabilities. The ADA clearly covers mental as well as physical
impairments. 339 EEOC regulations define the term "mental im-
pairment" as including "any mental or psychological disorder,
such as .. .emotional or mental illness."34 The EEOC has is-
sued an enforcement guidance with respect to psychiatric disabil-
ities that lists major depression, bipolar disorder, anxiety
disorders, schizophrenia, and personality disorders as examples
of covered mental impairments.3 4 1 That guidance goes on to sug-
gest that these impairments are disabling if they substantially
limit a major life activity such as learning, thinking, concentrat-
ing, interacting with others, caring for oneself, sleeping, or
working.342
Despite these statutory and regulatory guidelines, courts have
not been receptive to most mental disability claims. A survey of
1997 federal court decisions shows that the vast majority of
claims based on alleged mental impairments are rejected. 343
Courts are particularly prone to dismiss these claims at the sum-
336 Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1996); Shiring v. Runyon, 90
F.3d 827 (3rd Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir.
1995).
337 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1998); Myers v. Hose,
50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995).
338 Smith, 138 F.3d at 1309; see also Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700
(5th Cir. 1995) ("we do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of
individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given
priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are not disabled").
339 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
340 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1998).
341 See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: The Americans with Disabilities Act and
Psychiatric Disabilities, 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 405:7461. 7462 (1999).
342 Id. at 7463.
343 Michael Higgins, No Sudden Impact: Courts Rejecting Mental Disability Claims
Despite the EEOC Guidelines Intended to Protect Mentally Ill, 83 A.B.A.J. 24 (Nov.
1997) (showing that employers prevailed in 32 out of 37 court decisions involving
mental disability claims that were published between April and August 1997).
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mary judgment stage on grounds that the asserted impairment
does not rise to the level of a protected disability.3 44
Possible explanations for the restrictive treatment of mental
disabilities again reflect important societal concerns. First,
mental disabilities are invisible in nature. Unlike most physical
impairments, employers often have little tangible evidence as to
the existence and/or severity of psychiatric problems.345 Second,
society long has been biased against individuals with mental dis-
orders.3 4 6 While physical impairments may provoke sympathy,
mental impairments are associated with societal stigma. 347 Thus,
court decisions dismissing mental disability claims may reflect, in
part, the notion that mental disorders are less worthy of legal
protection. Finally, it is difficult to untangle behavior caused by
unprotected personality traits from behavior caused by protected
mental disabilities. This concern is noted by Walter Olson, the
author of the best selling book, The Excuse Factory:
Few laws have done as much as the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act to make a note from your doctor something you can
take to the bank. Much ADA discussion has proceeded as if
mental and emotional disorders were as easily and objectively
diagnosed as chicken pox. For some "classic" mental illnesses
there is indeed fair consensus regarding diagnosis and treat-
ment, but the bounds of many others are almost entirely a
function of line-drawing by psychiatric professionals. "If you
look at [the diagnostic manual]," Yale professor Jay Katz has
conceded, "you can classify all of us under one rubric or an-
other of mental disorder." 348
Many share Mr. Olson's concern that the ADA should not be
read to saddle employers with workers who are forgetful, con-
frontational, or habitually late; no matter what the reason for
344 Id. (showing that employers succeeded in 26 out of 30 motions to dismiss
mental disability claims at the trial court level during the survey period).
345 See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345,
350 (1997).
346 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("the mentally retarded have been subject to a 'lengthy and
tragic history,' of segregation and discrimination that can only be called gro-
tesque."); see also Peggy R. Mastroianni & Carol R. Miaskoff, Coverage of Psychiat-
ric Disorders under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 723 (1997).
347 Mark Clements, What We Say About Mental Illness, PARADE MAGAZINE, Oct.
31, 1993, at 4-5 (discussing results of a poll in which 70% of those responding said
that there was a stigma attached to an individual admitting to having a mental
illness).
348 Walter Olson, THE EXCUSE FACTORY 134 (1997).
OREGON LAW REVIEW
such behavior. This concern also may underlie some court deci-
sions denying mental disability claims, such as those decisions re-
jecting the EEOC viewpoint that the "ability to get along with
others" is a protected major life activity.349
In these and other ways, competing visions with respect to the
goals and purposes of the ADA add fuel to the fire of judicial
dissonance. Is the ADA simply a nondiscrimination statute that
protects individuals with severe physical impairments from dis-
crimination? Or does the statute impose affirmative obligations
on employers to avoid making prejudicial employment decisions
with respect to individuals with significant or potentially signifi-
cant impairments, including those with performance problems re-
sulting from mental disorders?
E. Individualized Inquiry
A final source of judicial dissonance is the individualized in-
quiry used to determine ADA claims. Federal courts repeatedly
have declined to recognize particular conditions as disabilities
per se.35 ° These courts, instead, engage in a particularized factual
inquiry into each individual claimant's physical or mental limita-
tions, with disability status determined by the extent of each per-
son's limitations.351
Courts also take an individualized approach to the reasonable
accommodation/undue hardship tandem of issues. This is partic-
ularly true with respect to the undue hardship phase which the
statute itself describes as a floating standard depending upon
each employer's type of operation and resources. 2
349 See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997) (re-
jecting such a major life activity as an amorphous and unworkable concept); Weiler
v. Household Finance Corp., 101 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting disability status
based upon an employee's ability to get along with a particular supervisor).
350 See, e.g., Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385 (5th Cir. 1993); McKey v.
Occidental Chem. Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (S.D. Tex. 1997). The EEOC inter-
pretive guidance apparently suggests that some impairments, such as HIV infection,
should be treated as disabilities per se because they are "inherently substantially
limiting." See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1998).
351 See, e.g., Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assoc., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir.
1996); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996); Ennis v. National Ass'n
of Bus. and Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1995).
352 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994). The reasonable accommodation phase tends to
have more of a generalized focus (i.e., is this accommodation a reasonable one for
most employers) while the undue hardship phase tends to have more of an individu-
alized focus (i.e., does the accommodation pose an undue hardship for this particular
employer). Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Even the reasonable ac-
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This ad hoc approach to decisionmaking contributes to a diver-
gence in judicial opinion in a number of ways. First, the individu-
alized approach is less predictable than one which recognizes
certain per se disabilities and, second, it necessarily fosters more
litigation. As noted with respect to the ADA's complicated an-
tidiscrimination formula,3 5 3 increased litigation provides more
opportunities for divergent judicial viewpoints.
The individualized inquiry approach also is not conducive to
the creation of precedent. 4 Thus courts have a larger zone of
discretion in deciding each individual case. This phenomenon is
most noticeable with respect to cases examining the major life
activity of "working." The regulations provide that an individual
is substantially limited in the major life activity of working if he
or she is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.355 The regulations further
state, in contrast, that the inability to perform a single, particular
job is not a substantial limitation. 6 Courts, under this standard,
have considerable leeway to find that an individual is either dis-
abled or not disabled depending on how the disqualified group-
ing of jobs is described.
This result is aptly illustrated by the Sixth Circuit's decision in
McKay v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc. , a case in-
volving an assembly-line worker with carpal tunnel syndrome ac-
companied with lifting and repetitive motion restrictions. The
majority opinion in McKay found the plaintiff not to be disabled
because she was unable to perform "only the narrow range of
assembly line manufacturing jobs that require repetitive motion
or frequent lifting." '358 The dissent reviewed the same evidence
and concluded that the plaintiff was disabled because she was dis-
commodation phase, however, has an individualized component in terms of seeking
to link the disabled individual's limitations with an accommodation that will enable
the performance of essential functions. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1998). Some
courts, moreover, view the reasonable accommodation issue as incorporating a cost/
benefit analysis which necessarily takes individual circumstances into account. See
Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
353 See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text.
3 54 See Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How
Individualizing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 327, 332-33 (1997).
355 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1998).
356 Id.
357 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997). The McKay decision is discussed supra at notes
127-34 and accompanying text.
358 Id. at 373.
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qualified from all heavy duty jobs, as well as all medium duty
jobs and many light and sedentary jobs that require repetitive
motion.359 Whether an individual is disabled because of a limita-
tion on the activity of working, apparently, is in the eyes of the
beholder.
One other major impact flows from the individualized inquiry
approach. Because each ad hoc determination requires a de-
tailed factual analysis, this approach makes each ADA case a
likely candidate for a lengthy jury trial. This is hardly a welcome
prospect for a judiciary that already is beset with a deluge of
ADA cases.36 ° The desire to curb a burgeoning jury trial
caseload may be part of the explanation for a growing tendency
among the federal trial courts to dispose of cases at the summary
judgment stage.361 A review of the decisions discussed with re-
spect to our set of ten issues shows case after case in which the
courts have granted and upheld rulings to dismiss ADA claims as
a matter of law. A recent study by the American Bar Associa-
tion, showing that employers have prevailed in ninety-two per-
cent of all court rulings involving ADA claims, bears out this
trend.362 The most common justification for achieving such a re-
sult is a stringent interpretation of the "disability" '363 and "rea-
sonable accommodation ' 361 concepts. If an individual plaintiff is
not disabled or cannot possibly be afforded an accommodation
that is reasonable, a jury trial on the merits is unnecessary.
F Summary
Once the above factors are taken into account, the current di-
vergence in the judicial interpretation of the ADA is not surpris-
ing. The ADA's complicated antidiscrimination formula,
implemented through an individualized mode of analysis, inevita-
bly leads to a crush of litigation. The lack of statutory detail as
well as skepticism over the EEOC's role heighten the judiciary's
ability to exercise discretion in resolving these cases. Finally, the
359 Id. at 374-78 (Hillman, J. dissenting).
360 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
361 See Lanctot, supra note 354, at 332.
362 Reported in 158 LRR (BNA) 257 (1998).
363 See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir.
1997); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg, U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997). See
also Lanctot, supra note 354, at 329-33; id. at 270.
364 See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1998); Myers
v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995).
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courts, confronted with the crucial policy choices posed by the
ADA and a growing tide of litigation, have powerful incentives
to construe the ADA in ways quite differently than envisioned by
agency guidelines.
IV
THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN
It is not unusual for a new statute to spawn issues needing judi-
cial resolution. Over time, however, the appellate courts gener-
ally resolve the more pivotal, policy-driven issues arising under a
new statute and turn their attention to more routine issues of
statutory enforcement and interstitial interpretation.
The ADA, at least thus far, has been slow to follow this evolu-
tionary course. The Court's response to these initial cases may
provide some insight into whether the judicial dissonance phe-
nomenon will continue or whether a greater consensus will
emerge.
During its last two terms, the Supreme Court has decided six
cases under the ADA. Some of these decisions are of the
landmark variety, others are less significant and/or companion
cases.36 5 Three of these decisions, each of which address one of
our set of ten disputed issues, are particularly significant for our
purposes. This section summarizes each of these three decisions
and then analyzes their likely impact on the judicial dissonance
phenomenon.
A. The Cases
1. Bragdon v. Abbott366
The Bragdon v. Abbott decision arose under Title III of the
365 This Article will not discuss the three "lesser" decisions which do not address
highly contested issues of first impression concerning the workplace. See Albert-
sons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999) (holding that monocular vision is
not a per se disability, but must be assessed on a case-by-case basis taking into ac-
count mitigating measures such as the brain's ability to compensate for loss of vision
in one eye); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) (holding that
determination of whether an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life
activity should be made with reference to mitigating measures, and that an employee
who could not obtain Department of Transportation certification to drive commer-
cial vehicles because of high blood pressure was not substantially limited in the ma-
jor life activity of working); Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S.
206 (1998) (holding that Title II of the ADA applies in the context of state prisons).
366 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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ADA.36 7 The plaintiff, Sidney Abbott, was infected with HIV,
but the disease had not yet progressed to the symptomatic phase.
In 1994, Ms. Abbott visited the office of Dr. Randon Bragdon for
a dental appointment. Dr. Bragdon conducted the examination
and discovered a cavity in one of Abbott's teeth. Bragdon in-
formed Abbott that he had a policy against filling cavities of pa-
tients with HIV in an office setting. He offered to treat Abbott
at a hospital which would entail added expense for Abbott.368
Abbott brought suit claiming that Bragdon's actions violated
Title III of the ADA by denying Abbott equal access to a place
of public accommodation. Bragdon denied liability on two
grounds. First, Bragdon contended that Abbott was not a pro-
tected individual with a disability under the ADA. Second, Brag-
don maintained that treating Abbott in his office would pose a
direct threat to the health and safety of others. The district
court 36 9 and the First Circuit Court of Appeals37 ° ruled for Ab-
bott on both issues as a matter of law.
a. Disability
As noted above,371 a five-member majority of the Supreme
Court affirmed the First Circuit's determination that Abbott was
disabled for purposes of the ADA. The majority opinion au-
thored by Justice Kennedy ruled that Abbott's HIV status, even
at the asymptomatic stage, substantially limited the major life ac-
tivity of reproduction.372
In support of its conclusion that reproduction is a major life
activity under the ADA, the majority stressed the importance of
reproduction as "central to the life process itself. '3 73 In doing so,
the majority opinion rejected the dissent's argument that major
life activities only include those actions that are "repetitively per-
formed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normal
367 Although arising from a Title III claim of discrimination lodged against a pub-
lic accommodation, the Bragdon decision clearly has important implications for Ti-
tle I claims grounded in the employment context. Both the "disability" and "direct
threat" terms construed in Bragdon are defined similarly for Title I and Title III
purposes.
368 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629.
369 Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
370 Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).
371 The Bragdon decision also is discussed supra at notes 114-20 and accompany-
ing text.
372 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641, 646.
373 Id. at 638.
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functioning individual." '374 The Court, instead, agreed with the
First Circuit's reasoning that "the plain meaning of the word 'ma-
jor' denotes comparative importance, and suggests that the
touchstone for determining an activity's inclusion under the stat-
utory rubric is its significance." '375
The majority opinion also found that the risk of transmitting
the virus through sexual intercourse and childbirth substantially
limited Abbott's ability to engage in reproductive activities.
Even though new medications can lower the risk of transmission,
the Court stated that "[i]t cannot be said as a matter of law that
an 8% risk of transmitting a dread[ed] and fatal disease to one's
child does not represent a substantial limitation on reproduc-
tion." '3 76 The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, in
contrast, asserted that Abbott's decision not to engage in repro-
ductive acts was a voluntary choice rather than the result of an
actual limitation on her ability to do so.377
The majority opinion also noted that its conclusion was sup-
ported by a consistent course of agency interpretation promul-
gated both before and after enactment of the ADA.3 78 The
administrative and judicial precedent under the Rehabilitation
Act, upon which the ADA was modeled, had uniformly found
statutory coverage for persons with asymptomatic HIV.37 9 The
regulatory agencies charged with enforcing the ADA, in this case
both the EEOC and the DOJ, similarly have construed individu-
als infected with HIV to be disabled.38 ° The Court stressed that
these agency interpretations are entitled to deference.381
b. Direct Threat
On the second issue, the majority opinion held that "[t]he
existence, or nonexistence, of a significant [health or safety] risk
must be determined from the standpoint of the person who re-
fuses the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment
must be based on medical or other objective evidence. '38a In
374 Id. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
375 Id. at 638.
376 Id. at 641.
377 Id. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
378 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642-48.
379 Id. at 642-46.
380 Id. at 643-46.
381 Id. at 641.
382 Id. at 649.
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making this objective determination, the Court explained, the
views of public health authorities should receive special weight
and authority.383 The Court found that Bragdon failed to present
any objective evidence "showing that treating [Abbott] in a hos-
pital would be safer or more efficient in preventing HIV trans-
mission than treatment in a well-equipped dental office."3 84 The
Court, nonetheless, vacated and remanded this issue on the
grounds that the First Circuit did not cite sufficient material in
the record to determine, as a matter of law, that Abbott's HIV
infection posed no direct threat to the health and safety of
others.385
The Bragdon decision is a clear, albeit narrow, victory for
those advocating a broader reading of the ADA.386 However,
the Bragdon decision may be as significant for what it did not
decide as for what it did. The Bragdon Court declined to rule on
whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA.38 7
This may prove to be a major omission both because of the ongo-
ing debate over whether any per se disabilities exist under the
ADA and because of the possibility that some individuals with
383 Id. at 650. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent finds no basis to give the opinions
of public health authorities this degree of deference in cases of litigation between
two private parties. See id. at 663 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
384 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 651.
385 Id. at 650-54.
386 The dissent in Bragdon reads the majority opinion as potentially more expan-
sive if "taken to its logical extreme." Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 661 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). In discussing the meaning of the "substantially limits" requirement, the
dissent warns of the possible impact of the majority's approach:
But the ADA's definition of a disability is met only if the alleged impair-
ment substantially 'limits' (present tense) a major life activity. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(20)(A). Asymptomatic HIV does not presently limit respondent's
ability to perform any of the tasks necessary to bear or raise a child. Re-
spondent's argument, taken to its logical extreme, would render every indi-
vidual with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here
and now because of some possible future effects.
Id. This reading of the majority opinion appears to be overstated. The Bragdon
majority found Abbott to be disabled, not because of the possible future effects of
HIV, but because of the present limitation on her ability to engage in reproductive
activities. Bragdon, at 637-42. Thus, a genetic marker or other indicator of a future
impairment poses a situation clearly distinguishable from Bragdon unless it also en-
tails a substantial present limitation on a major life activity, such as the ability to
reproduce. In any event, the Sutton decision, discussed infra at notes 404-38 and
accompanying text, makes it clear that disability status is to be determined with
reference to an individual's present status, rather than with reference to an individ-
ual's hypothetical or even anticipated status. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-47 (1999).
387 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
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HIV infection may not qualify as disabled for ADA purposes.
This latter possibility arises from the Court's statement, in the
paragraph summarizing its disability conclusion, that "testimony
from [Abbott] that her HIV infection controlled her decision not
to have a child is unchallenged" and must be accepted as true.388
One possible interpretation of this comment is that the Court
views HIV as a substantial limitation on reproduction, and hence
a covered disability, only for individuals who otherwise would
desire to procreate. The dissent clearly adopts this position.389 If
this reading is accurate, it could have the anomalous effect that
many members of the demographic group most heavily impacted
by HIV-gay men-may have no standing under the ADA if
they cannot establish a preexisting interest in reproduction.
2. Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation39 °
After suffering a stroke in January 1994, Carolyn Cleveland
applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits
claiming that she was "disabled" and "unable to work."3 91 The
Social Security Administration (SSA) denied Cleveland's claim
in July 1994, shortly after her condition improved and she re-
turned to work.3 92 Cleveland's employer, Policy Management
Systems Corporation, fired her later that same month.393 Cleve-
land then requested the SSA to reconsider her SSDI application,
and in September 1995, she was awarded benefits retroactive to
the day of her stroke.3 94 Also in September, she brought suit
under the ADA alleging that her employer had discriminated
against her by not reasonably accommodating her disability.
395
The district court granted summary judgment to the employer
finding that Cleveland had conceded that she was totally disabled
by virtue of applying for and receiving SSDI benefits, and was
now estopped from claiming that she could perform the essential
functions of her job. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the
388 Id. at 640-43.
389 Id. at 657-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the ADA requires that
the major life activity at issue must be one for that particular individual, and that the
record contained no evidence that Abbott, absent HIV infection, had planned to
have children).
390 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
391 Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1600.
392 Id.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.
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receipt of SSDI benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that
the recipient is judicially estopped from asserting that he or she is
a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.3 96 The
Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision.
The Supreme Court first looked at the respective definitions of
disability under the two statutes. The court noted that represen-
tation of total disability in applying for SSDI benefits differs from
a purely factual statement in that it "implies a context-related
legal conclusion" of being disabled for purposes of the SSA.3 97
The Court concluded that despite the apparent conflict that
arises from the language of the two statutes, "the two claims do
not inherently conflict to the point where courts should apply a
special negative presumption.., because there are too many sit-
uations in which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim can comforta-
bly exist side by side. 398
The Court explained that the ADA's definition of a "qualified
individual with a disability" includes someone who can perform
the essential functions of a job with reasonable accommoda-
tion.39 9 The SSA, in contrast, does not take into account the pos-
sibility of reasonable accommodation. Therefore, an ADA claim
in which a plaintiff may be able to perform a job with reasonable
accommodation may be consistent with an SSDI claim of
disability.4"
The Cleveland Court also identified other situations in which
ADA and SSDI claims may coexist consistently. The Court
pointed out that the five-step inquiry under the SSA inevitably
simplifies a person's situation, "eliminating consideration of
many differences potentially relevant to an individual's ability to
perform a particular job."'. The Court also noted that the SSA
sometimes grants benefits to individuals who are working and
that a claimant's condition can change such that a person's state-
ment at the time of filling out an application for SSDI benefits
may not reflect an individual's capacities at the time of the rele-
vant employment decision for ADA purposes.40 2
396 Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 518-19 (5th Cir.
1997).
397 Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1601.
398 Id. at 1602.
399 Id.
40 0 Id.
401 Id. at 1603.
402 Id. The Court also compared an individual's applying for relief under both
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The Court acknowledged that in some circumstances an earlier
SSDI claim could conflict with an ADA claim thereby making
summary judgment appropriate. The Court held that to defeat
summary judgment in such a case, a plaintiff's explanation con-
cerning the prior statement must be sufficient to warrant a rea-
sonable juror's conclusion that the plaintiff could perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation .
403
3. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 4'
The Sutton decision is the most far-reaching of the three cases.
Petitioners Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton are twin sisters
who both suffer from severe myopia. Each has uncorrected vis-
ual acuity of 20/200 in one eye and 20/400 in the other, but with
corrective lenses their vision improves to 20/20 or better.40 5 In
1992, both sisters applied for employment with United Air Lines
(United) as commercial airline pilots. United rejected both sis-
ters because they did not meet minimum, uncorrected vision re-
quirements.4° Petitioners brought suit under the ADA, alleging
that they fit within the protected class of individuals with a "disa-
bility" because of their respective vision impairments or, alterna-
tively, because they are regarded as having a substantially
limiting impairment.
The district court dismissed the complaint concluding that the
twin sisters were not disabled and the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed. 407 Both courts ruled that the sisters were not sub-
stantially limited in any major life activity when their
impairments were considered in their corrected states. The two
courts also found that the plaintiffs were not regarded as having
disabling impairments. The Supreme Court affirmed in a 7-2 de-
cision, with Justice O'Connor authoring the majority opinion.
The Court initially noted that both the EEOC and the DOJ have
issued guidelines recommending that the question of whether a
person is disabled should be assessed without regard to mitigat-
statutes to making alternative arguments, noting that if an individual has merely
applied for, but not been awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the theory of
claims is the kind normally tolerated by our legal system. Id.
403 Id. at 1604.
404 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999).
405 Id. at 2143.
406Id.
407 See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
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ing measures.4 °8 While the Court suggested that the ADA did
not delegate authority to any administrative agency to interpret
the statute's "disability" definition, the Court declined to address
what deference is due those guidelines.40 9
a. Actual Disability
Turning to the merits, the Court found that the agencies' ap-
proach of evaluating a person's disability status in his or her un-
corrected state is "an impermissible interpretation of the
ADA."41 0 The court stated:
[I]t is apparent that if a person is taking measures to correct
for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of
those measures - both positive and negative - must be taken
into account when judging whether that person is "substan-
tially limited" in a major life activity and thus "disabled"
under the Act.411
Concluding that the ADA's text could not be read otherwise, the
majority opinion saw no reason to look to the ADA's legislative
history for further guidance.412
The Court stated that three separate provisions of the ADA
support this conclusion. First, the Court looked at the definition
of a covered "disability" which uses the phrase "substantially
limits" in the present indicative verb form.413 According to the
majority, this temporal benchmark indicates that a person must
be "presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially
limited in order to demonstrate a disability. ' 414 The Court rea-
soned that a person whose impairment is corrected by mitigating
measures does not have an impairment that presently substan-
tially limits a major life activity, and therefore should not be con-
sidered disabled under the Act.4 15
The Court secondly stressed the importance of making an indi-
vidualized inquiry with respect to each person making an ADA
claim. The Court opined that the instruction from Guidance to
judge everyone in an uncorrected state would impermissibly cre-
408 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145-46.
409 Id.
410 Id. at 2146.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id. at 2146-47.
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ate a system in which persons would be treated as members of a
group rather than as individuals.416
Finally, the Court placed great weight on the Congressional
findings set out in the ADA's preamble to the effect that the Act
would protect "some 43,000,000 Americans. ' 417 The Court ex-
plained that this figure would be much higher if all persons with
corrected conditions were covered by the statute. The Court
concluded that "the 43 million figure reflects an understanding
that those whose impairments are largely corrected by medica-
tion or other devices are not 'disabled' within the meaning of the
ADA."418
In spite of rejecting the agency guidance, the court clarified
that it did not mean that the use of a corrective device by an
individual would automatically mean that he or she was not dis-
abled. The Court stressed that one has a disability if, notwith-
standing the use of a corrective device, that individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity. 419 Under the facts of
this case, however, the Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit that
the petitioners did not state a claim that they were substantially
limited in any major life activity under the first prong of the "dis-
ability" definition.42°
b. Regarded as Disabled
The Supreme Court also rejected the petitioner's alternative
contention that they were protected under the ADA because
they were "regarded as" disabled. The Sutton majority explained
that an individual may fall within this third prong of the statutory
"disability" definition in either of two ways: "(1) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that
416 Id. at 2147. The court also reasoned that the EEOC and DOJ approach was
incorrect because it would not allow the courts or employers to consider negative
side effects resulting from the use of mitigating measures. Id.
417 See id. at 2147-48 (discussing Congressional findings set out in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(1)).
418 Id.
419 Id. at 2149.
420 Id. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the conclusion that the first prong of the
disability definition does not reach individuals with correctable impairments. Id. at
2152 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She found important support for this result in the
fact that Congress described the intended class of those protected by the ADA as a
"discrete and insular minority" consisting of approximately 43 million people. Id.
(citing to 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(1),(7)). She explained that this is a telling indication
of Congress' intent to restrict the ADA's coverage to a "confined, and historically
disadvantaged, class." Id. at 2152.
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substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a cov-
ered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting im-
pairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. 421
In either situation, the impairment, as perceived, must be one
that substantially limits one or more major life activities.422
Applying this standard to the Sutton facts, the Court ruled that
the mere allegation that an employer has a vision requirement
does not establish that the employer regarded the petitioners as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The
Court noted that an employer may adopt hiring qualifications
under the ADA and, in so doing, may prefer some physical char-
acteristic or medical conditions, that do not rise to the level of a
disabling impairment, over others.423  Further, while questioning
the logic of EEOC regulations that recognize "working" as a ma-
jor life activity for purposes of the ADA,42 4 the Court stated that
this fact scenario, in any event, did not support a claim that the
employer regarded them as having an impairment that substan-
tially limited their ability to work in either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs as the regulations require.425 At best, the
employer only regarded them as unable to perform the single job
of a global airline pilot.426
c. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens427 and Justice Breyer both authored dissenting
opinions.428 Both agreed with the EEOC and DOJ guidance in-
421 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999).
422 Id.
423 Id. at 2150.
424 Id. at 2151 (The Court stated "[b]ecause the parties accept that the term 'ma-
jor life activities' includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited
regulations. We note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in de-
fining 'major life activities' to include work, for it seems to argue in a circle to say
that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from working with
others] ... then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you're
asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap.") (citation omitted).
425 Id. at 2151 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)).
426 Sutton, 119 s. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999). The court also noted that it is not enough
to say that if the physical criteria of a single employer were imputed to all similar
employers, one then would be regarded as substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. Id. at 2152.
427 Id. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer joined in the dissent au-
thored by Justice Stevens.
428 Id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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structing courts to consider the issue of disability status without
taking mitigating measures into consideration.
Justice Stevens noted that if the ADA were only concerned
with a person's present capabilities, many serious impairments
would not be covered by the ADA.429 He offered the example of
an individual who has lost a limb, but who, with a prosthetic de-
vice, can perform major life activities. According to Justice Ste-
vens, if an employer refuses to hire such a person because of
stereotypical assumptions concerning the impairment, the em-
ployer has discriminated against that person in a manner that
Congress intended to prohibit.43 ° Justice Stevens said that his
reading of the statute avoids the "counterintuitive conclusion
that the ADA's safeguards vanish when individuals make them-
selves more employable by ascertaining ways to overcome their
physical or mental limitations."43'
Justice Stevens further asserted that his interpretation was sup-
ported by the relevant legislative history. He pointed out that
both the House and Senate reports on the bill that became the
ADA clearly indicate that a person's disability status should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating meas-
ures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.432
In general, Justice Stevens advocates a less arduous construc-
tion of the ADA's standing requirement than the majority,
thereby allowing more plaintiffs to get past the threshold ques-
tion of whether they are members of the ADA's protected class.
He contended that this would make the interpretation of ADA
closer to Title VII and the ADEA, which do not impose rigid
standing requirements.433 According to Justice Stevens, this ap-
proach more appropriately focuses on whether an affected em-
ployee is genuinely qualified to perform the job or whether that
429 Id. at 2153-54.
430 Id. at 2154. See also id. at 2159 ("Congress enacted the ADA in part because
such individuals [with impairments such as prosthetic limbs or epilepsy] are not ordi-
narily substantially limited in their mitigated condition, but rather are often the vic-
tims of 'stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such
individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society."') (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(7)).
431 Id. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
432 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-55. Justice Stevens also gave weight to the fact that
all three of the executive agencies charged with implementing the Act came to the
conclusion that the presence of a disability should turn on an individual's uncor-
rected state. Id. at 2155-56.
433 See id. at 2156.
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person poses an undue safety risk.43 4
Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissent. His main purpose
in doing so apparently was to express his opinion that the EEOC
appropriately does have authority to issue regulations concerning
the meaning of the "disability" definition contained in the
ADA.4 3 5 While the ADA only authorizes the EEOC to adopt
regulations to carry out the employment provisions of Title I,
Justice Breyer indicated his belief that the EEOC has the author-
ity to interpret the definition of "disability" which appears in the
statute's preamble so long as such elaboration is necessary in or-
der to carry out the substantive provisions of Title 1.436 Justice
Breyer reasoned that Congress would not have wanted to deny
the EEOC the power to issue such a regulation, at least where it
is consistent with the statutory definition and other relevant
interpretations.437
B. Impact on the Judicial Dissonance Phenomenon
The three decisions summarized above resolve three out of our
ten disputed issues. While this reduces the amount of dissonance
in our sample set, the question remains whether these decisions
will lead to a greater degree of judicial consensus in addressing
ADA issues more generally. This subsection revisits the sources
of judicial dissonance in light of these decisions.438
1. Lack of Statutory Detail
The three decisions arguably serve to reduce the impact of the
ADA's imprecise statutory language in two different ways. First,
the cases resolve three thorny interpretive issues while adding
some useful gloss on the sparse ADA text. Bragdon and Sutton
434 Id. at 2156-57.
435 Justice Breyer also expressed his agreement with Justice Stevens concerning
the mitigating measures issue. He stated that when faced with the choice of either
including some people that Congress may not have intended to protect or excluding
some of those whom Congress certainly did want to protect, the statute's language,
structure, purpose, and history favor the first option. See id. at 2161 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
436 Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (authorizing the EEOC to issue regulations to carry
out "this subchapter," referring to the employment subchapter).
437 Id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
438 The three decisions had no apparent impact on two of these sources. The
ADA's more complicated antidiscrimination formula and the significance of the un-
resolved ADA policy issues were not altered by these cases. These two factors, ac-
cordingly, will not be reviewed in this subsection except to note that they will
continue to provide an impetus for divergent judicial viewpoints.
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provide some guidance in determining who is encompassed
within the protected class of individuals with a "disability." The
Cleveland decision similarly clarifies the interplay between the
ADA and the Social Security Act.
These decisions, however, likely will not bring much clarity be-
yond the specific issues resolved. Take, for example, the Court's
construction of the "substantial limits" prong of the disability
definition in Bragdon and Sutton, probably the ADA provision
most closely scrutinized in these cases. The Bragdon court ruled
that the "substantially limits" requirement does not mean that an
individual must be wholly incapable of performing a major life
activity,439 while the Court in Sutton ruled that the degree of lim-
itation should be ascertained after considering the impact of miti-
gating measures.44 ° While these are useful and important pieces
of information, they do not shed any light on how any of the
remaining disputed issues in our subset should be resolved.
Moreover, since these rulings push in opposite directions, they
do not signal an obvious expansion or contraction of the statu-
tory language.
On another level, the Bragdon Court indicated that judicial
and administrative precedent under the Rehabilitation Act
should be followed in interpeting the ADA.44' The Bragdon
Court found it significant that every federal court decision prior
to the ADA's enactment concluded that asymptomatic HIV in-
fection satisfied the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a covered
handicap.442 Agency interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act
consistently reached similar conclusions.44 3 This Rehabilitation
Act precedent is important, the Court noted, because the ADA's
definition of disability "is drawn almost verbatim from the defini-
tion of 'handicapped individual' included in the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973." ' The Court, accordingly, summarized the impact
of Rehabilitation Act precedent as follows:
We find the uniformity of the administrative and judicial
439 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
440 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
441 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641-46.
442 1d. at 644.
443 Id. at 642-46.
44 Id. at 631. The Bragdon Court also noted that the ADA itself states that,
except as otherwise provided, nothing in the ADA shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. See 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
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precedent construing the definition [under the Rehabilitation
Act] significant. When administrative and judicial interpreta-
tions have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provi-
sion, repetition of the same language in a new statute
indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its ad-
ministrative and judicial interpretations as well. [citations
omitted]. The uniform body of administrative and judicial
precedent confirms the conclusion we reach today as the most
faithful way to effect the congressional design.44
At first blush, the Bragdon Court's admonition to give Reha-
bilitation Act precedent virtual stare decisis effect would appear
to add considerable flesh to the bare bones of the ADA. This
impact, however, is limited by two factors discussed above.4 46
First, the ADA is not simply a broader reenactment of the Reha-
bilitation Act. Congress, while using the Rehabilitation Act as a
model, deviated from that statute's language in a number of sig-
nificant respects. Second, most of the key issues currently in dis-
pute under the ADA were never determined authoritatively
under the Rehabilitation Act. Of our set of ten issues, only the
asymptomatic HIV issue had been clearly resolved prior to the
enactment of the ADA. As a result, the recognition of Rehabili-
tation Act precedent for ADA purposes is likely to have only a
modest effect in terms of reducing the divergence in judicial con-
struction of the ADA.
2. Lack of Agency Deference
The Bragdon and Sutton decisions took very different ap-
proaches to the topic of agency deference. While the majority
opinion in Bragdon broadly deferred to agency interpretations of
the ADA concerning the disabling nature of HIV infection, the
Sutton majority explicitly rejected agency guidelines with respect
to the impact of mitigating measures.
The Bragdon decision contains a strong endorsement of the
relevant administrative agency guidance. The Court stated that
its conclusion that asymptomatic HIV is a covered disability was
"further reinforced" by guidance issued by the EEOC with re-
spect to Title I of the ADA and by the DOJ with respect to Title
111. 4 7 The majority opinion explained that, as agencies directed
by Congress to issue implementing regulations and to provide
445 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 645 (1998).
446 See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
447 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 644-48.
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technical assistance concerning the ADA, their "views are enti-
tled to deference. 448
The Court's favorable review of agency interpretation, of
course, is not a new development in the law. The Court's well-
known Chevron doctrine, announced in 1984, holds that a re-
viewing court should adhere to an agency's regulatory interpreta-
tion where a statute is silent or ambiguous and the interpretation
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.449 The
Bragdon Court simply invoked the Chevron doctrine in stating
that the views of the administrative agencies charged with inter-
preting and enforcing the ADA "are entitled to deference. ' 450
Bragdon, at least in a pre-Sutton world, offered hope of a way
out of the judicial dissonance thicket. The EEOC and the DOJ
have adopted interpretative positions with respect to the vast ma-
jority of currently contested issues under the ADA. If the Brag-
don decision truly represented a directive by the Supreme Court
to follow administrative agency guidance whenever feasible, the
current din of judicial confusion soon will be on the wane.
This would be a positive development. The generally liberal
interpretation provided by the two agencies conforms to Con-
gress' fundamental purpose of enacting the ADA in order "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties. ' 45 1 In contrast, the current pattern of judicial unrest results
in considerable uncertainty for those subject to ADA regulation.
This uncertainty, in turn, generates increased administrative costs
in terms of legal advice and litigation.
Perhaps most importantly, no alternative solution appears im-
minent. Decisive congressional action in adding detail to the
ADA is unlikely, leaving repeated Supreme Court intervention
as the only other option. The two available paths seem clear:
courts will either follow Bragdon and defer to agency guidance
or continue on a long and arduous path of judicial dissonance.
The Court appears to have chosen the latter course in its more
recent Sutton decision. In that decision, the majority opinion
written by Justice O'Connor firmly rejected the agencies' reading
448 Id. at 646.
449 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984).
450 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 646.
451 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
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of the ADA. The Sutton majority noted that both the EEOC
and the DOJ had issued guidelines indicating that the determina-
tion of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major
life activity should be made without considering the impact of
mitigating measures.452 Finding this interpretation to be incon-
sistent with three separate provisions of the statute,453 the Court
dismissed the guidelines as "an impermissible interpretation of
the ADA.
454
Beyond directly rejecting the agencies' views with respect to
the mitigating measures issue, the Sutton opinion also raised two
other warning flags concerning the status of agency guidance
under the ADA. First, the Sutton Court suggested that agency
promulgations concerning the definition of a covered "disability"
may not be legally authorized. While recognizing that Congress
authorized three different agencies to issue regulations concern-
ing those portions of the ADA that they are entrusted to admin-
ister, the Court stated: "No agency, however, has been given
authority to issue regulations implementing the generally appli-
cable provisions of the ADA, see §§ 12101-12102, which fall
outside Titles I-V. Most notably, no agency has been delegated
authority to interpret the term 'disability. ' ' 45 5 Because neither
party challenged the validity of the agency regulations (or appar-
ently the interpretive guidance), the Court concluded that it need
not decide how much deference they were due.456
More narrowly, the Sutton opinion casts doubt on the validity
of the EEOC's regulations as to when an individual has standing
under the ADA because of a substantial limitation on the major
life activity of "working." In this regard, the Court stated:
Because the parties accept that the term "major life activities"
includes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited
regulations. We note, however, that there may be some con-
ceptual difficulty in defining "major life activities" to include
work, for it seems "to argue in a circle to say that if one is
excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment from
working with others] ... then that exclusion constitutes an im-
pairment, when the question you're asking is, whether the ex-
452 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145-46.
453 The three provisions relied upon by the Sutton majority are discussed supra at
notes 413-18 and accompanying text.
454 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
455 Id. at 2145.
456 Id. at 2145-46.
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clusion itself is by reason of handicap. 457
The Court concluded that plaintiffs had not established that the
employer regarded them as substantially limited in their ability
to work, even "[a]ssuming without deciding that working is a ma-
jor life activity and that the EEOC regulations . . . are
reasonable. 4 58
The Sutton decision appears to have significantly retracted the
pro-deference message of Bragdon. Prior to Bragdon, as noted
above,45 9 the lower courts frequently disregarded agency gui-
dance on the grounds that the statute clearly expressed itself in a
manner differently than as construed by the administrative agen-
cies. The Bragdon decision appeared to signal a pro-deference
direction, and some courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in Washing-
ton v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc. ,460 began to defer to
plausible agency guidance even while noting that they would
have reached a different conclusion on their own. The Sutton
Court's rejection of agency guidance, however, will surely drown
out Bragdon's earlier pro-deference admonition. Here, actions
speak louder than words and the Court in Sutton essentially rep-
licated the pre-Bragdon practice of judicial nondeference when a
different reading of the ADA's sparse text lends itself to a more
desirable result.
The Sutton decision goes even further, however, by suggesting,
without deciding, that the EEOC's regulations concerning "disa-
bility" and "working" may be invalid. These suggestions provide
even more reasons for courts to ignore agency guidance. By rais-
ing questions that it does not decide, the Court inevitably creates
more confusion for lower courts which must now debate both
whether agency guidance was validly adopted and whether it
stakes out a reasonable position.
The Bragdon Court's message of agency deference provided
the best hope for overcoming the problem of judicial dissonance
in the near futue. The Sutton decision, unfortunately, not only
rejected this path, but adds still more fuel to the fire of judicial
dissonance.
457 Id. at 2151.
458 Id. at 2151-52.
459 See supra notes 320-24 and accompanying text.
460 152 F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1998). The Washington decision is discussed supra
at notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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3. Individualized Inquiry
Perhaps the only point on which all three opinions agree is that
the analysis of discrimination claims under the ADA requires an
individualized inquiry.46' In Bragdon, Justice Kennedy's opinion
declined to resolve Abbott's argument that HIV infection is a per
se disability.462 The Court stated that it "need not address" that
question in light of its ruling that Abbott, herself, met the defini-
tion of an individual with a disability. 463 In Cleveland, the Court
rejected the notion that a declaration of disability status for pur-
poses of Social Security benefits automatically precludes the de-
clarant from simultaneously claiming to be a qualified individual
under the ADA.4" The Court, instead, adopted an approach
that focuses on that individual's explanation of the particular cir-
cumstances surrounding the two assertions.465 The Sutton opin-
ion contains the strongest endorsement of the individualized
inquiry approach. In rejecting agency guidance with respect to
the impact of mitigating measures, the Court stated: "The defini-
tion of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated 'with
respect to an individual' and be determined based on whether an
impairment substantially limits the 'major life activities of such
individual' § 12102(2). Thus, whether a person has a disability
under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. ' 466 The Court con-
cluded that the guidelines approach was inconsistent with such
an individualized inquiry because it "would create a system in
which persons often must be treated as members of a group of
people with similar impairments, rather than as individuals. 4 67
As discussed above,46 8 the individualized inquiry approach
feeds the judicial dissonance phenomenon by fostering increased
litigation and deterring the accumulation of precedent. The
461 The Supreme Court also endorsed an individualized inquiry approach in Al-
bertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). In that case, the Court over-
turned an appeals court determination that monocular vision is a per se disability,
complaining that "the Court of Appeals did not pay much heed to the statutory
obligation to determine the existence of disabilities on a case-by-case basis." Id. at
2169.
462 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642.
463 Id. The Bragdon dissent clearly embraced a case-by-case approach. See id. at
648 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "[it is important to note that whether
respondent has a disability covered by the ADA is an individualized inquiry.").
464 Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1603.
465 Id. at 1603-04.
466 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
467 Id.
468 See supra notes 350-64 and accompanying text.
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strong preference exhibited by the Court for this case-by-case ap-
proach, accordingly, is not likely to lead toward a greater judicial
consensus in construing the ADA.
In determining whether the policy benefits of this approach
outweigh the costs of continued dissonance, it is important to re-
member that the individualized inquiry approach operates at two
different stages of an ADA case." 9 As in Bragdon and Sutton,
an individualized inquiry is used by courts in determining the
threshold question of whether an individual has a "disability."
Courts also use an individualized focus in the subsequent stage of
determining whether a claimant is a "qualified" individual who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
sential functions of the job, as in the Cleveland context.
The individualized inquiry approach makes considerable sense
in the latter context. At the "qualified" stage of an ADA case,
an individualized inquiry properly focuses on the objective capa-
bilities of each individual claimant rather than on presumed
group stereotypes.47 ° Thus, an individualized inquiry at this stage
serves a purpose similar to the McDonnell Douglas test under
Title VII in terms of providing a framework for isolating legiti-
mate and illegitimate reasons for employment decisions.47'
The individualized inquiry approach makes less sense, how-
ever, at the earlier stage of determining whether an individual is
disabled and has standing to pursue an ADA claim. At this
stage, a certain degree of predictability is preferable. Both em-
ployees and employers would benefit from knowing what types
of impairments are covered by the ADA. An individualized fo-
cus as to standing in each and every case is not conducive to that
end.
This drawback is illustrated in the Sutton Court's discussion of
diabetes and the need for an individualized standing inquiry.
The Court correctly noted that under the guidelines approach of
disregarding mitigating measures, "courts would almost certainly
469 See supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
470 This, of course, is a key objective of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(7)
(finding that individuals with disabilities have been subject to unequal treatment
"based on characteristics ... resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indica-
tive of the individual ability of such individuals"), and 12101(b)(1) (articulating as a
purpose of the ADA "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
471 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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find all diabetics to be disabled. 4 72 Under Sutton's more indi-
vidualized mode of analysis, in contrast, ADA coverage will ex-
tend only to those diabetics who are significantly limited even
with a constant regimen of monitoring blood sugar levels and in-
sulin therapy.473
The Sutton Court views this more individualized focus as bene-
ficial. We disagree. Under the guidelines approach, diabetes is a
disability. This result is predictable and comports with the undis-
puted legislative history.4 74 Under the approach adopted in Sut-
ton, it is not known who is covered by the statute without
continual resort to litigation.
An individualized inquiry at the "disability" stage, moreover,
does not serve the same anti-discrimination purposes as at the
"qualified" stage. Indeed, the individualized approach at the
earlier stage frequently results in claimants never getting to the
stage at which qualifications are assessed. 475 Thus, under Sutton,
an employer is free to rely on stereotypical assumptions in refus-
ing to hire or promote an individual whose diabetes is under con-
trol because of medication. An employer is prohibited only from
discriminating with respect to those few diabetics for whom med-
ication does little or no good. The use of an individualized in-
quiry in this context overly accentuates the ADA's unique
standing requirement 476 and results in a perilously thin zone of
individuals who are both "disabled" and yet "qualified. 477
The Bragdon and Sutton decisions also suggest that the indi-
vidualized inquiry approach may encompass two difficult subjec-
tive components when invoked at the "disability" stage. The
472 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
473 Id. at 2149.
4 74 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 53 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334 ("persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substan-
tially limit a major life activity are covered under the first prong of the definition of
disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication").
475 See supra notes 360-64 and accompanying text.
476 See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2156-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the
mitigating measures issue only impacts the issue of standing and, even under the
guidelines approach, leaves employers free to demand that covered employees are
qualified to perform the job).
477 As Arlene Mayerson, directing attorney of the Disability Rights Education
and Defense Fund, commented with regard to Sutton, "[i]t doesn't make any sense
to consider ADA plaintiffs in their corrected state if employers rejected them be-
cause of uncorrected conditions." 17 Human Resources Report 761 (BNA, July 19,
1999).
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478Bragdon decision, as discussed above, can be read as necessi-
tating an inquiry into the subjective inclinations of some plaintiffs
in order to determine disability status. The Bragdon dissent
stressed that whether an activity is a major life activity is a sub-
jective inquiry with respect to each individual claimant. 479 The
Bragdon majority responded by noting that the record estab-
lished that reproduction was a major life activity for Abbott.48 °
One possible meaning of this exchange is that the disability de-
termination for individuals with asymptomatic HIV is dependent
upon whether each particular claimant would otherwise desire to
procreate. If this reading is accurate, then, it suggests that cer-
tain activities may constitute a "major life activity" only if they
are subjectively important to that particular individual. Such a
standard would require an individualized inquiry of the most dif-
ficult kind-one that attempts retroactively to ascertain an indi-
vidual's subjective intent. It also could result in the anomaly that
two individuals with the same degree of impairment are treated
differently in terms of their respective disability status. If the
Court has adopted this standard, and we certainly hope that it
has not, then the Bragdon decision only adds to the confusion.
The Sutton decision requires courts to probe the minds of em-
ployers in ascertaining the reach of the third prong of the "disa-
bility" definition. Under that prong, an individual is disabled if
an employer "regards" that individual as having an impairment
that substantially limits one or more life activites of that individ-
ual. 481 The Court in Sutton ruled that an individual is "regarded
as" disabled if an employer mistakenly believes that a person's
nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major
life activities. 482 On the other hand, the Sutton opinion ex-
plained that an individual is not "regarded as" disabled simply
because an employer believes that a person's nonlimiting impair-
ment precludes him or her from adequately performing the job at
483issue. The crucial distinction, then, is the employer's subjec-
tive perception.
Once again, this subjective inquiry may mean that two individ-
uals who are similarly situated in terms of impairment could be
478 See supra notes 387-89 and accompanying text.
479 Bragdon, 524 U.S. 657-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
480 Id. at 2206-07.
481 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
482 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152.
483 Id.
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treated disparately for ADA standing purposes. Take the situa-
tion of Karen Sutton and her twin sister Kimberly Hinton. Each
sister has uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 or worse that is cor-
rectable with corrective lenses to 20/20 vision." Let's assume
that United Air Lines decides not to hire Karen because it per-
ceives her eyesight impairment as interfering with her ability to
perform adequately as a global airline pilot. Let's also assume
that United Air Lines decides not to hire Kimberly because it
perceives her eyesight impairment as interfering with her ability
to perform a broad range of jobs including that of a global airline
pilot. Under the reasoning of the Sutton majority, Kimberly has
standing as an individual with a disability, while Karen does not.
As noted in Justice Steven's dissenting opinion, Congress ap-
parently intended that impairments should be viewed in their un-
mitigated state under prong one of the "disability" definition
because of the difficulty of ascertaining an employer's subjective
intent under prong three. 485 By rejecting this viewpoint, the
Court in Sutton unwisely amplified the importance of this diffi-
cult prong three inquiry.
The use of an individualized inquiry approach at the "disabil-
ity" stage, accordingly, is prone to considerable mischief. As an
objective inquiry, the individualized focus inhibits predictability
and unreasonably shrinks the class of individuals with legal pro-
tection from employment decisions based on sterotypical as-
sumptions. Bragdon and Sutton compound the problem by
adding two additional subjective components to this inquiry. By
expanding the role of an individualized inquiry beyond its rea-
sonable policy limitations, the Supreme Court has provided im-
petus for yet more judicial dissonance.
4. Additional Considerations
Three other aspects of these decisions further suggest that the
judicial dissonance phenomenon will continue for many years to
come. First, the three decisions fail to signal a direction in which
the lower courts should head in interpeting the ADA. Bragdon
and Cleveland represent a broadening of employee rights, while
Sutton is a resounding pro-employer victory. In pure mathemati-
cal terms, this may suggest somewhat of a pro-employee tilt. In
reality, however, the opposite is more likely true as Sutton is
484 Id. at 2143.
485 See id. at 2155 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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both the most far-reaching and the most recent of these deci-
sions. In any event, these decisions push in different directions
and the lower courts likely will follow suit.
Second, these cases reveal very pronounced differences in how
the individual justices view the ADA. In both Bragdon and Sut-
ton, the majority and dissenting opinions depict a wide concep-
tual gulf. The tenor of the opinions suggest that much is at stake
and that the battle lines are just being drawn. In this regard,
these decisions tend to mirror the judicial dissonance phenome-
non rather than resolve it.
Finally, the likely continuance of the judicial dissonance phe-
nomenon is further illustrated by the fact that more new issues
have arisen during the past year than those which the Supreme
Court has resolved. During the most recent Spring 1999 version
of the ADA in the Workplace course, we added four new issues
on which the circuit courts of appeal currently are divided.486 As
with the original ten issues, the divergence of judicial perspective
on these issues is deep and intractable.
CONCLUSION
The ADA is in turmoil. More to the point, the courts are in
turmoil over the ADA. At stake is a crush of litigation and the
future direction of the ADA. The Supreme Court, in its first ma-
jor decisions under the statute, has failed to chart a course that
will lead to a broader uniformity of interpretation. If anything,
486 The four new issues are as follows:
(1) Is an employer liable under the ADA for failing to engage in an in-
teractive process to ascertain the existence and feasibility of a reasonable
accommodation? Compare Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Re-
gents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996) (yes), with Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157
F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 1998) (no).
(2) In determining whether an individual is qualified for ADA purposes,
should regular and predictable attendance be presumed to constitute an
essential job function? Compare Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277
(11th Cir. 1994) (yes), with Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research
Ctr., 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998) (no).
(3) Must a job applicant be disabled in order to challenge an employer's
practice of making impermissible pre-employment inquiries? Compare
Armstrong v. Turner Indus., 950 F. Supp. 162 (M.D. La. 1996), affd on
other grounds, 141 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 1998) (yes), with Griffin v. Steeltek,
Inc., 160 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1998) (no).
(4) Does the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
bar an ADA claim against a state in federal court? Compare Brown v.
North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (yes),
with Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998) (no).
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the Court's three major decisions provide still more opportuni-
ties for the lower courts to head off in a dizzying variety of direc-
tions. Before we lose our way in this dense legal thicket, the
Court should back up and rediscover the road map that it laid
out in the Bragdon decision. By revisiting Bragdon's lesson of
deferring to administrative agency guidance, the judiciary can
chart a path out of confusion and toward consensus.
